More than a decade of insurgency has forced thousands of families in Nigeria’s Borno State from their homes, livelihoods and communities. As security conditions gradually improve, the state is stepping up efforts to resettle nearly 300,000 internally displaced people and close IDP camps.
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Monday, August 10, 2026
Video - Nigeria’s Borno resettles nearly 300,000 IDPs as insecurity persists
More than a decade of insurgency has forced thousands of families in Nigeria’s Borno State from their homes, livelihoods and communities. As security conditions gradually improve, the state is stepping up efforts to resettle nearly 300,000 internally displaced people and close IDP camps.
Video - Rescued Nigerian kidnap victims recount ordeal after months in captivity
Nigerian security forces this week rescued more than 300 people abducted in separate attacks in Kwara and Niger states. President Bola Tinubu described the operation as the largest same-day hostage rescue in Nigeria’s history. The victims are now receiving medical evaluation and treatment, with some recounting their ordeal after months in captivity.
Wednesday, July 22, 2026
Nigeria arrested suspected terrorists returning from Hajj. But several questions are unanswered
The atmosphere inside the international arrivals terminal at the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua International Airport in Katsina was one of celebration. Families stood behind security barriers waiting to embrace relatives returning from Saudi Arabia after completing the 2026 Hajj pilgrimage. Airport officials moved methodically through familiar administrative routines, and returning pilgrims wheeled their luggage toward the main arrival hall after presenting their travel documents for standard border clearance.
Then, without warning to the waiting crowd, the routine changed.
As passengers stepped forward one after another for immigration clearance, border control officers quietly isolated seven men from the rest of the arriving passengers. There was no public commotion, no shouting, and no dramatic confrontation inside the terminal. The men were discreetly separated from the other pilgrims, escorted out of public view under heavy security detail, and placed in immediate custody.
Within hours, the seven detainees were moved out of the airport under armed escort and subsequently flown to Abuja, where they were handed over to the State Security Service (SSS).
Days later, the Minister of Interior, Olubunmi Tunji-Ojo, made a public announcement that transformed the quiet airport operation into a subject of intense national debate. The minister stated that security agencies had intercepted seven suspected commanders of Boko Haram and ISWAP who had returned from the Hajj through the Katsina airport.
Nigeria faces several types of terrorism from groups like ISWAP, Boko Haram, and bandits. Several groups of bandits operate in Katsina, where thousands of people have been killed or kidnapped in recent years.
The government presented the arrests as evidence of Nigeria’s expanding digital border management capabilities, highlighting technical advancements in biometric identity verification and real-time intelligence coordination among security agencies.
As of the time of publishing this story, neither the federal government nor the SSS has publicly released the identities of the seven suspects or announced any criminal charges against them.
While the minister’s announcement generated major headlines across the country, it also left behind a series of fundamental questions. The most critical question raised by the operation is not how the men were apprehended upon their return, but how they managed to leave Nigeria in the first place.
Unlike some transnational criminals who utilise forged travel documents, stolen identities, or clandestine border crossings, immigration officials familiar with the operation confirmed to PREMIUM TIMES that the seven suspects travelled using valid Nigerian international passports issued in their own legal names and identities.
The seven men completed all official Hajj travel procedures before leaving Nigeria. This paradox raises difficult accountability questions extending far beyond the immediate fate of the seven suspects: What specific security screening protocols exist before an intending pilgrim is cleared to leave Nigeria? Which institutions bear the statutory responsibility for identifying registration applicants who are already on national security watchlists? Did the intelligence identifying these suspects emerge only while they were overseas, or were crucial opportunities to intercept them missed before they boarded their outbound flight? Most fundamentally, where does administrative accountability reside among the overlapping state and federal institutions that coordinate one of Nigeria’s largest annual international migrations?
Over several days of field reporting, PREMIUM TIMES interviewed security personnel familiar with the airport operation, spoke with anonymous policy and intelligence sources, questioned civil society leaders, and visited the headquarters of the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board. PREMIUM TIMES also reviewed official government statements, examined the administrative mechanics of the annual Hajj workflow, and sought clarifications from every primary institution involved.
What emerged was a fragmented institutional picture. Federal authorities describe the operation as a successful intelligence-led border interdiction enabled by integrated digital systems, while civil society groups argue it exposed weaknesses in pre-departure vetting. Several of the institutions responsible for processing intending pilgrims either declined to explain their screening procedures or failed to answer key questions.
Rather than determining the guilt or innocence of the suspects, this investigation examines how those institutional responsibilities intersect and where accountability for pre-departure screening ultimately lies.
Then, without warning to the waiting crowd, the routine changed.
As passengers stepped forward one after another for immigration clearance, border control officers quietly isolated seven men from the rest of the arriving passengers. There was no public commotion, no shouting, and no dramatic confrontation inside the terminal. The men were discreetly separated from the other pilgrims, escorted out of public view under heavy security detail, and placed in immediate custody.
Within hours, the seven detainees were moved out of the airport under armed escort and subsequently flown to Abuja, where they were handed over to the State Security Service (SSS).
Days later, the Minister of Interior, Olubunmi Tunji-Ojo, made a public announcement that transformed the quiet airport operation into a subject of intense national debate. The minister stated that security agencies had intercepted seven suspected commanders of Boko Haram and ISWAP who had returned from the Hajj through the Katsina airport.
Nigeria faces several types of terrorism from groups like ISWAP, Boko Haram, and bandits. Several groups of bandits operate in Katsina, where thousands of people have been killed or kidnapped in recent years.
The government presented the arrests as evidence of Nigeria’s expanding digital border management capabilities, highlighting technical advancements in biometric identity verification and real-time intelligence coordination among security agencies.
As of the time of publishing this story, neither the federal government nor the SSS has publicly released the identities of the seven suspects or announced any criminal charges against them.
While the minister’s announcement generated major headlines across the country, it also left behind a series of fundamental questions. The most critical question raised by the operation is not how the men were apprehended upon their return, but how they managed to leave Nigeria in the first place.
Unlike some transnational criminals who utilise forged travel documents, stolen identities, or clandestine border crossings, immigration officials familiar with the operation confirmed to PREMIUM TIMES that the seven suspects travelled using valid Nigerian international passports issued in their own legal names and identities.
The seven men completed all official Hajj travel procedures before leaving Nigeria. This paradox raises difficult accountability questions extending far beyond the immediate fate of the seven suspects: What specific security screening protocols exist before an intending pilgrim is cleared to leave Nigeria? Which institutions bear the statutory responsibility for identifying registration applicants who are already on national security watchlists? Did the intelligence identifying these suspects emerge only while they were overseas, or were crucial opportunities to intercept them missed before they boarded their outbound flight? Most fundamentally, where does administrative accountability reside among the overlapping state and federal institutions that coordinate one of Nigeria’s largest annual international migrations?
Over several days of field reporting, PREMIUM TIMES interviewed security personnel familiar with the airport operation, spoke with anonymous policy and intelligence sources, questioned civil society leaders, and visited the headquarters of the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board. PREMIUM TIMES also reviewed official government statements, examined the administrative mechanics of the annual Hajj workflow, and sought clarifications from every primary institution involved.
What emerged was a fragmented institutional picture. Federal authorities describe the operation as a successful intelligence-led border interdiction enabled by integrated digital systems, while civil society groups argue it exposed weaknesses in pre-departure vetting. Several of the institutions responsible for processing intending pilgrims either declined to explain their screening procedures or failed to answer key questions.
Rather than determining the guilt or innocence of the suspects, this investigation examines how those institutional responsibilities intersect and where accountability for pre-departure screening ultimately lies.
How the Hajj Vetting and Registration System Works
To evaluate how the seven suspects departed the country, it is first necessary to reconstruct the structured administrative process that an ordinary citizen must follow to perform the annual pilgrimage under Nigeria’s official framework.
Travelling for Hajj is not a simple commercial transaction; for the vast majority of Nigerian Muslims, it is a months-long, highly regulated bureaucratic process involving shared responsibilities among state governments, federal agencies, and Saudi Arabian authorities.
The operational chain begins at the grassroots level under the direct control of state agencies, such as the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board, where designated Hajj officials receive applications and guide prospective pilgrims through the registration process. Following seasonal consultations with Saudi Arabian authorities, the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) sets and announces the official annual Hajj fare, which covers airfare, accommodation in Mecca and Medina, meals, local transport, and associated logistics.
Prospective pilgrims must deposit this approved fare, which has risen sharply in recent years to between seven and eight million Naira due to macroeconomic inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, directly into the state board’s designated bank accounts.
Once financial obligations are satisfied, the applicant proceeds to the documentation stage. Interviews with Hajj stakeholders and border control officials indicate that the international passport has become the centralised identity document underpinning the entire modern registration workflow. Unlike in previous decades, when multiple separate supporting identity documents and physical clearance forms were collected manually by local boards, the vast majority of an applicant’s personal information, including biometric data and National Identification Numbers (NIN), is now embedded directly within the passport itself following enrollment by the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS).
Once local documentation closes, the state pilgrims welfare board compiles the names of qualified applicants from across its local government areas into a comprehensive statewide register. This unified list is transmitted to NAHCON headquarters in Abuja for national coordination.
NAHCON subsequently uploads the pilgrims’ data into Saudi Arabia’s electronic Hajj portal, through which the Saudi Ministry of Hajj and Umrah issues the mandatory entry visas electronically. Only after the electronic visas are approved are the pilgrims assigned to outbound flights, and final passenger manifests are generated for each state delegation, indicating exactly who is cleared to board each charter aircraft.
According to immigration officials who spoke to PREMIUM TIMES anonymously, the NIS’s statutory responsibilities change significantly as the process moves from passport issuance to airport departure clearance. It was learned that the primary daily mandate of officers stationed at the international departure terminals is to enforce immigration laws governing valid exit and entry, establish identity, and verify the physical integrity of travel documents.
Therefore, according to the officers interviewed, immigration officers primarily verify identity and travel documents and rely on intelligence alerts or watchlists supplied through the wider national security system when determining whether a traveller should be intercepted.
An immigration officer stationed in the region explained that their core role at the departure gate is passenger clearance. The source stated that when a traveller presents a passport, biometric verification and document checks are conducted to confirm that the passport is genuine and that the bearer standing before the officer is the legitimate holder of the document.
The official emphasised that routine immigration clearance remains an identity check, whereas the specialised tracking of terrorism suspects or the management of active criminal intelligence falls within the distinct purview of specialised intelligence agencies.
Federal pilgrimage authorities further clarify this division of responsibilities. Contacted by PREMIUM TIMES regarding the boundaries of federal oversight, NAHCON spokesperson Fatima Usara clarified that NAHCON is not statutorily positioned to conduct background checks or profile individual travellers.
Mrs Usara stated that NAHCON does not conduct screening operations, clarifying that such mandates fall squarely on individual state units. According to her, state pilgrims’ welfare boards function as direct operators, handling grouping and overseeing pilgrim manifests, while NAHCON acts strictly as a manager and regulator, tasked with establishing administrative standards, issuing policy statements, and monitoring implementation.
Regarding national security protocols, Mrs Usara added that while NAHCON maintains security agencies as affiliates to assist the matrix, the primary curation of manifests remains decentralised at the state operational level.
This dynamic exposes a critical operational divide. While border immigration personnel at the airport verify identity at the point of international travel and federal regulators monitor compliance with standards, the active vetting of individual backgrounds rests with the state-level frameworks that initially compile the lists. Many states, however, lack the capacity for such vetting, as Nigeria currently operates a unitary security system in which virtually all security agencies are owned and controlled by the federal government.
To understand how the seven suspects passed through these early administrative stages, PREMIUM TIMES visited the Katsina headquarters of the State Pilgrims Welfare Board to obtain an official explanation of the administrative safeguards and background checks built into the pilgrim recruitment process. The board declined to provide details of the process.
During the visit, the Executive Director of the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board, Yunusa Dankama, declined to discuss the registration workflow or to explain what protocols exist for cross-referencing applicant lists with national security watchlists.
The official maintained that details regarding the processing of the state’s Hajj delegation are classified information that cannot be disclosed to the public or the press, asserting that such operational transparency is reserved solely for registered, intending pilgrims. He said that the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board is strictly a logistical and administrative body, not a security agency.
This refusal to disclose the screening workflow leaves a gap in the public’s understanding of the administrative processes. While border security personnel at the airport mapped out their point-of-exit responsibilities, the state institution responsible for processing the applicants, compiling the delegation register, and authorising the final flight manifests declined to explain how its screening safeguards operate before pilgrims reach the tarmac.
One question investigators may still need to answer is whether any local documentation, including letters or clearances issued under regional community peace and amnesty initiatives, formed part of the application process for persons later described by federal authorities as security suspects.
To evaluate how the seven suspects departed the country, it is first necessary to reconstruct the structured administrative process that an ordinary citizen must follow to perform the annual pilgrimage under Nigeria’s official framework.
Travelling for Hajj is not a simple commercial transaction; for the vast majority of Nigerian Muslims, it is a months-long, highly regulated bureaucratic process involving shared responsibilities among state governments, federal agencies, and Saudi Arabian authorities.
The operational chain begins at the grassroots level under the direct control of state agencies, such as the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board, where designated Hajj officials receive applications and guide prospective pilgrims through the registration process. Following seasonal consultations with Saudi Arabian authorities, the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) sets and announces the official annual Hajj fare, which covers airfare, accommodation in Mecca and Medina, meals, local transport, and associated logistics.
Prospective pilgrims must deposit this approved fare, which has risen sharply in recent years to between seven and eight million Naira due to macroeconomic inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, directly into the state board’s designated bank accounts.
Once financial obligations are satisfied, the applicant proceeds to the documentation stage. Interviews with Hajj stakeholders and border control officials indicate that the international passport has become the centralised identity document underpinning the entire modern registration workflow. Unlike in previous decades, when multiple separate supporting identity documents and physical clearance forms were collected manually by local boards, the vast majority of an applicant’s personal information, including biometric data and National Identification Numbers (NIN), is now embedded directly within the passport itself following enrollment by the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS).
Once local documentation closes, the state pilgrims welfare board compiles the names of qualified applicants from across its local government areas into a comprehensive statewide register. This unified list is transmitted to NAHCON headquarters in Abuja for national coordination.
NAHCON subsequently uploads the pilgrims’ data into Saudi Arabia’s electronic Hajj portal, through which the Saudi Ministry of Hajj and Umrah issues the mandatory entry visas electronically. Only after the electronic visas are approved are the pilgrims assigned to outbound flights, and final passenger manifests are generated for each state delegation, indicating exactly who is cleared to board each charter aircraft.
According to immigration officials who spoke to PREMIUM TIMES anonymously, the NIS’s statutory responsibilities change significantly as the process moves from passport issuance to airport departure clearance. It was learned that the primary daily mandate of officers stationed at the international departure terminals is to enforce immigration laws governing valid exit and entry, establish identity, and verify the physical integrity of travel documents.
Therefore, according to the officers interviewed, immigration officers primarily verify identity and travel documents and rely on intelligence alerts or watchlists supplied through the wider national security system when determining whether a traveller should be intercepted.
An immigration officer stationed in the region explained that their core role at the departure gate is passenger clearance. The source stated that when a traveller presents a passport, biometric verification and document checks are conducted to confirm that the passport is genuine and that the bearer standing before the officer is the legitimate holder of the document.
The official emphasised that routine immigration clearance remains an identity check, whereas the specialised tracking of terrorism suspects or the management of active criminal intelligence falls within the distinct purview of specialised intelligence agencies.
Federal pilgrimage authorities further clarify this division of responsibilities. Contacted by PREMIUM TIMES regarding the boundaries of federal oversight, NAHCON spokesperson Fatima Usara clarified that NAHCON is not statutorily positioned to conduct background checks or profile individual travellers.
Mrs Usara stated that NAHCON does not conduct screening operations, clarifying that such mandates fall squarely on individual state units. According to her, state pilgrims’ welfare boards function as direct operators, handling grouping and overseeing pilgrim manifests, while NAHCON acts strictly as a manager and regulator, tasked with establishing administrative standards, issuing policy statements, and monitoring implementation.
Regarding national security protocols, Mrs Usara added that while NAHCON maintains security agencies as affiliates to assist the matrix, the primary curation of manifests remains decentralised at the state operational level.
This dynamic exposes a critical operational divide. While border immigration personnel at the airport verify identity at the point of international travel and federal regulators monitor compliance with standards, the active vetting of individual backgrounds rests with the state-level frameworks that initially compile the lists. Many states, however, lack the capacity for such vetting, as Nigeria currently operates a unitary security system in which virtually all security agencies are owned and controlled by the federal government.
To understand how the seven suspects passed through these early administrative stages, PREMIUM TIMES visited the Katsina headquarters of the State Pilgrims Welfare Board to obtain an official explanation of the administrative safeguards and background checks built into the pilgrim recruitment process. The board declined to provide details of the process.
During the visit, the Executive Director of the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board, Yunusa Dankama, declined to discuss the registration workflow or to explain what protocols exist for cross-referencing applicant lists with national security watchlists.
The official maintained that details regarding the processing of the state’s Hajj delegation are classified information that cannot be disclosed to the public or the press, asserting that such operational transparency is reserved solely for registered, intending pilgrims. He said that the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board is strictly a logistical and administrative body, not a security agency.
This refusal to disclose the screening workflow leaves a gap in the public’s understanding of the administrative processes. While border security personnel at the airport mapped out their point-of-exit responsibilities, the state institution responsible for processing the applicants, compiling the delegation register, and authorising the final flight manifests declined to explain how its screening safeguards operate before pilgrims reach the tarmac.
One question investigators may still need to answer is whether any local documentation, including letters or clearances issued under regional community peace and amnesty initiatives, formed part of the application process for persons later described by federal authorities as security suspects.
The Outbound Trajectory: Why suspects were not intercepted at departure
The physical operation that culminated in the isolation of the seven suspects at the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua International Airport unfolded in a matter of minutes during routine arrival clearance. However, the far more significant question confronting investigators and security analysts is why the same security architecture that successfully intercepted the men upon their return permitted them to board their outbound flight weeks earlier.
PREMIUM TIMES sought to resolve this timeline paradox by interviewing border officials and those involved in policy-making and implementation.
According to an immigration officer privy to the airport operation, who asked not to be named as he was not authorised to speak on the matter, the suspects were not intercepted at the point of departure because the active intelligence process managed from Abuja had not yet reached the legal and operational stage where a physical border interception could be authorised.
The source stated that the investigation was still active during the outbound journey, but before the return flight landed, the intelligence process had matured, the facts were firmly established, and a definitive directive was transmitted from Abuja instructing that specific passengers on the incoming aircraft be apprehended immediately upon arrival.
This explanation was corroborated by a senior official at the NIS Headquarters in Abuja, who also provided details off the record.
The official revealed that the suspects’ data profiles had been processed and watchlisted by the NIS Integrated Operations Centre in Abuja before their return. The source indicated that allowing watchlisted individuals to depart can sometimes be part of a calculated tactical surveillance strategy, enabling intelligence agencies to solidify an evidentiary trail or monitor networks while relying on the pilgrimage’s logistical frameworks. Under these operational frameworks, pilgrims are generally scheduled to return through the same airport from which their state delegation departed.
The source, speaking anonymously, stated that the border management platform was fully prepared for their arrival, with the names and biometric profiles circulated to the Katsina Airport Command well before the aircraft entered Nigerian airspace. The source noted that the moment the suspects presented their passports at the arrival clearance desks, the harmonised system triggered an immediate alert, allowing personnel to isolate them quietly without interrupting the clearance of the rest of the flight.
All the officials spoken to confirmed that the seven suspects travelled using valid passports issued under their real names and genuine identities.
However, allowing the terror suspects to travel for Hajj only to arrest them upon their return is a risk. The suspects could have been arrested by Saudi authorities, who in the past have stopped and deported some Nigerian pilgrims despite their clearance by Nigerian authorities. Such a hypothetical arrest by Saudi authorities would have been an embarrassment to Nigeria. Worse is that the suspected terrorists could have chosen to commit acts of terror in Saudi Arabia, which would have significantly damaged Nigeria’s reputation. PREMIUM TIMES tried to put these questions before the SSS, but the agency declined to comment on this report.
While the explanations provided by officials in this report offer an operational account of the timing of the arrests, they leave the broader chronological question unanswered. At what point did the seven suspects first become subjects of security interest to federal intelligence agencies? Was definitive data linking them to insurgent activity available before they applied to join the Katsina State Hajj delegation, or did the information only become available after they left the country?
The physical operation that culminated in the isolation of the seven suspects at the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua International Airport unfolded in a matter of minutes during routine arrival clearance. However, the far more significant question confronting investigators and security analysts is why the same security architecture that successfully intercepted the men upon their return permitted them to board their outbound flight weeks earlier.
PREMIUM TIMES sought to resolve this timeline paradox by interviewing border officials and those involved in policy-making and implementation.
According to an immigration officer privy to the airport operation, who asked not to be named as he was not authorised to speak on the matter, the suspects were not intercepted at the point of departure because the active intelligence process managed from Abuja had not yet reached the legal and operational stage where a physical border interception could be authorised.
The source stated that the investigation was still active during the outbound journey, but before the return flight landed, the intelligence process had matured, the facts were firmly established, and a definitive directive was transmitted from Abuja instructing that specific passengers on the incoming aircraft be apprehended immediately upon arrival.
This explanation was corroborated by a senior official at the NIS Headquarters in Abuja, who also provided details off the record.
The official revealed that the suspects’ data profiles had been processed and watchlisted by the NIS Integrated Operations Centre in Abuja before their return. The source indicated that allowing watchlisted individuals to depart can sometimes be part of a calculated tactical surveillance strategy, enabling intelligence agencies to solidify an evidentiary trail or monitor networks while relying on the pilgrimage’s logistical frameworks. Under these operational frameworks, pilgrims are generally scheduled to return through the same airport from which their state delegation departed.
The source, speaking anonymously, stated that the border management platform was fully prepared for their arrival, with the names and biometric profiles circulated to the Katsina Airport Command well before the aircraft entered Nigerian airspace. The source noted that the moment the suspects presented their passports at the arrival clearance desks, the harmonised system triggered an immediate alert, allowing personnel to isolate them quietly without interrupting the clearance of the rest of the flight.
All the officials spoken to confirmed that the seven suspects travelled using valid passports issued under their real names and genuine identities.
However, allowing the terror suspects to travel for Hajj only to arrest them upon their return is a risk. The suspects could have been arrested by Saudi authorities, who in the past have stopped and deported some Nigerian pilgrims despite their clearance by Nigerian authorities. Such a hypothetical arrest by Saudi authorities would have been an embarrassment to Nigeria. Worse is that the suspected terrorists could have chosen to commit acts of terror in Saudi Arabia, which would have significantly damaged Nigeria’s reputation. PREMIUM TIMES tried to put these questions before the SSS, but the agency declined to comment on this report.
While the explanations provided by officials in this report offer an operational account of the timing of the arrests, they leave the broader chronological question unanswered. At what point did the seven suspects first become subjects of security interest to federal intelligence agencies? Was definitive data linking them to insurgent activity available before they applied to join the Katsina State Hajj delegation, or did the information only become available after they left the country?
Local Accountability: Allegations and state responses
The institutional silence surrounding the pre-departure vetting process has fueled intense public debate in Katsina State over how individuals later described by federal authorities as security suspects could successfully clear local registration channels. In the days following the Minister of Interior’s announcement, several regional commentators and social critics publicly raised questions regarding the source of the suspects’ funding and documentation.
Bashir Kurfi, a prominent local social critic, raised questions about whether individuals recently intercepted at the airport had been beneficiaries of official state-funded Hajj, potentially extended as part of local political amnesty and disarmament packages, to incentivise non-state armed actors to lay down their weapons.
In an official statement issued to the press, the Katsina State Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs described the allegations as entirely baseless and devoid of any factual basis. The Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, Nasir Mu’azu, added that the claims were politically motivated to undermine the state’s security operations and collaborations with federal forces. The ministry warned that the state government would not hesitate to pursue legal remedies against persons spreading defamatory misinformation.
PREMIUM TIMES found no evidence from the government’s public statements or from officials interviewed during this investigation that the seven detainees were beneficiaries of state-sponsored Hajj. Hajj pilgrims in Nigeria generally fall into three categories: self-funded, funded by a wealthy person, or state-funded.
Beyond the funding allegations, regional civil society organisations argue that the incident has raised questions about whether existing administrative safeguards are adequate to protect the grassroots layer of the pilgrimage administration. Abdulrahman Abdullahi, chairman of the Coalition of Civil Society Organisations in Katsina State, emphasised that the prolonged nature of Hajj logistics makes the lack of pre-departure detection a major public concern.
“An international pilgrimage is not an impromptu journey where a traveller walks into a commercial motor park and boards a vehicle,” Mr Abdulrahaman told PREMIUM TIMES. “The processing of fares, the enrollment of passports, the completion of local documentation, and the mandatory orientation exercises take several weeks or months. If individuals later officially labelled as security suspects completed all those stages before travelling, then it is important to understand what happened during that period. Security arrangements need to be proactive, not reactive.”
A similar institutional critique was articulated by Jamilu Charanchi, the national coordinator of the Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG). Mr Charanchi argued that the incident exposes the need for an independent review of the screening architecture surrounding official pilgrimages.
“If individuals suspected of serious involvement in terrorism can seamlessly utilise our official state pilgrimage pipelines to exit and re-enter the country unhindered, the current screening system demands deep scrutiny,” Mr Charanchi told PREMIUM TIMES. “Both the federal government, the state authorities, and the security leadership must constitute an independent investigative committee involving security agencies and relevant Hajj authorities to identify possible gaps in the screening process and strengthen future pilgrim vetting.”
The institutional silence surrounding the pre-departure vetting process has fueled intense public debate in Katsina State over how individuals later described by federal authorities as security suspects could successfully clear local registration channels. In the days following the Minister of Interior’s announcement, several regional commentators and social critics publicly raised questions regarding the source of the suspects’ funding and documentation.
Bashir Kurfi, a prominent local social critic, raised questions about whether individuals recently intercepted at the airport had been beneficiaries of official state-funded Hajj, potentially extended as part of local political amnesty and disarmament packages, to incentivise non-state armed actors to lay down their weapons.
In an official statement issued to the press, the Katsina State Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs described the allegations as entirely baseless and devoid of any factual basis. The Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, Nasir Mu’azu, added that the claims were politically motivated to undermine the state’s security operations and collaborations with federal forces. The ministry warned that the state government would not hesitate to pursue legal remedies against persons spreading defamatory misinformation.
PREMIUM TIMES found no evidence from the government’s public statements or from officials interviewed during this investigation that the seven detainees were beneficiaries of state-sponsored Hajj. Hajj pilgrims in Nigeria generally fall into three categories: self-funded, funded by a wealthy person, or state-funded.
Beyond the funding allegations, regional civil society organisations argue that the incident has raised questions about whether existing administrative safeguards are adequate to protect the grassroots layer of the pilgrimage administration. Abdulrahman Abdullahi, chairman of the Coalition of Civil Society Organisations in Katsina State, emphasised that the prolonged nature of Hajj logistics makes the lack of pre-departure detection a major public concern.
“An international pilgrimage is not an impromptu journey where a traveller walks into a commercial motor park and boards a vehicle,” Mr Abdulrahaman told PREMIUM TIMES. “The processing of fares, the enrollment of passports, the completion of local documentation, and the mandatory orientation exercises take several weeks or months. If individuals later officially labelled as security suspects completed all those stages before travelling, then it is important to understand what happened during that period. Security arrangements need to be proactive, not reactive.”
A similar institutional critique was articulated by Jamilu Charanchi, the national coordinator of the Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG). Mr Charanchi argued that the incident exposes the need for an independent review of the screening architecture surrounding official pilgrimages.
“If individuals suspected of serious involvement in terrorism can seamlessly utilise our official state pilgrimage pipelines to exit and re-enter the country unhindered, the current screening system demands deep scrutiny,” Mr Charanchi told PREMIUM TIMES. “Both the federal government, the state authorities, and the security leadership must constitute an independent investigative committee involving security agencies and relevant Hajj authorities to identify possible gaps in the screening process and strengthen future pilgrim vetting.”
Previous Security Arrests Linked to Pilgrimage
The Katsina operation is not the first time Nigerian security agencies have arrested high-profile security suspects in connection with religious pilgrimage.
In May 2025, SSS operatives arrested two wanted kidnap suspects during pre-departure Hajj screening. They included Yahaya Yakubu, arrested at the Abuja Hajj camp, and Sani Galadi, popularly known as Mai Boxer, who was arrested at the Sokoto Hajj camp before departing for Saudi Arabia.
Earlier, in September 2022, Tukur Mamu, who later faced terrorism-related charges, was intercepted in Cairo while travelling for Umrah before being returned to Nigeria and taken into DSS custody.
The Katsina case differs from these earlier incidents because the suspects were intercepted after completing the Hajj and returning to Nigeria. Their arrest was also publicly presented by the federal government as an example of the efficiency of Nigeria’s integrated biometric border management system.
The Katsina operation is not the first time Nigerian security agencies have arrested high-profile security suspects in connection with religious pilgrimage.
In May 2025, SSS operatives arrested two wanted kidnap suspects during pre-departure Hajj screening. They included Yahaya Yakubu, arrested at the Abuja Hajj camp, and Sani Galadi, popularly known as Mai Boxer, who was arrested at the Sokoto Hajj camp before departing for Saudi Arabia.
Earlier, in September 2022, Tukur Mamu, who later faced terrorism-related charges, was intercepted in Cairo while travelling for Umrah before being returned to Nigeria and taken into DSS custody.
The Katsina case differs from these earlier incidents because the suspects were intercepted after completing the Hajj and returning to Nigeria. Their arrest was also publicly presented by the federal government as an example of the efficiency of Nigeria’s integrated biometric border management system.
Transparency inquiries and outstanding responses
To ensure fairness and balance and give every relevant institution a fair opportunity to respond to the findings of this investigation, PREMIUM TIMES sought clarification from the leadership of all primary organisations within the Hajj and security pipelines.
The SSS was contacted to clarify whether the suspects were already under investigation or active surveillance before leaving Nigeria, when they were formally watchlisted, whether they have been charged, and whether investigations are ongoing. However, as of the time of publication, the agency’s spokesperson has not responded to our questions.
Conversely, NAHCON, through its spokesperson, Mrs Usara, clarified that it operates strictly as an administrative manager and regulator, stating that it does not conduct background screening or manage passenger manifests directly, as those operations are handled entirely by state-level boards.
Following repeated enquiries by PREMIUM TIMES, the Public Relations Officer of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Akinsola Akinlabi, confirmed that the Service arrested the suspects and handed them over to the requesting agency. He, however, declined to comment on operational details, including pre-departure screening procedures and the wider investigation, saying the matter remains sensitive and under investigation.
Meanwhile, this reporter visited the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board and enquired about grassroots documentation safeguards and the verification of local government area registries, but the executive director stated that the board is an administrative entity and not a security agency.
Finally, the Katsina State Government, via the Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs, issued a statement denying any state sponsorship or funding of the suspects’ travel and labelling all such rumours as politically motivated falsehoods unsupported by evidence.
To ensure fairness and balance and give every relevant institution a fair opportunity to respond to the findings of this investigation, PREMIUM TIMES sought clarification from the leadership of all primary organisations within the Hajj and security pipelines.
The SSS was contacted to clarify whether the suspects were already under investigation or active surveillance before leaving Nigeria, when they were formally watchlisted, whether they have been charged, and whether investigations are ongoing. However, as of the time of publication, the agency’s spokesperson has not responded to our questions.
Conversely, NAHCON, through its spokesperson, Mrs Usara, clarified that it operates strictly as an administrative manager and regulator, stating that it does not conduct background screening or manage passenger manifests directly, as those operations are handled entirely by state-level boards.
Following repeated enquiries by PREMIUM TIMES, the Public Relations Officer of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Akinsola Akinlabi, confirmed that the Service arrested the suspects and handed them over to the requesting agency. He, however, declined to comment on operational details, including pre-departure screening procedures and the wider investigation, saying the matter remains sensitive and under investigation.
Meanwhile, this reporter visited the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board and enquired about grassroots documentation safeguards and the verification of local government area registries, but the executive director stated that the board is an administrative entity and not a security agency.
Finally, the Katsina State Government, via the Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs, issued a statement denying any state sponsorship or funding of the suspects’ travel and labelling all such rumours as politically motivated falsehoods unsupported by evidence.
Conclusion
As the seven suspects remain in federal custody and investigations continue, the central questions raised by the Katsina operation remain unresolved. The arrests demonstrated that Nigeria’s border security system can identify watchlisted travellers at the point of arrival.
What remains unclear is whether the institutions responsible for processing intending pilgrims had access to information that could have prevented the journey in the first place. Until those questions are answered, the case will continue to test not only Nigeria’s counterterrorism architecture but also the accountability of the agencies responsible for the country’s largest annual international migration.
As the seven suspects remain in federal custody and investigations continue, the central questions raised by the Katsina operation remain unresolved. The arrests demonstrated that Nigeria’s border security system can identify watchlisted travellers at the point of arrival.
What remains unclear is whether the institutions responsible for processing intending pilgrims had access to information that could have prevented the journey in the first place. Until those questions are answered, the case will continue to test not only Nigeria’s counterterrorism architecture but also the accountability of the agencies responsible for the country’s largest annual international migration.
By Ogalah Dunamis, Premium Times
Monday, June 22, 2026
How Nigerian terrorists use TikTok, exploit country’s digital governance gap
A week after the Sadiku-led Boko Haram faction killed and abducted more than 170 women and children from Woro in Kaiama, Kwara State, the terror group released a video on TikTok mocking the government and accusing it of “deceit and infidelity” for downplaying the number of kidnapped victims.
The 90-second video was shared on the Chinese-owned social media platform by a handler identified as Abu Muhammad Abba, a coinage that could be genuine but is more likely a pseudonym, as is common within jihadist circles.
Shortly after the clip went viral in February, both the video and the account disappeared from the platform, suggesting that the account may have been deactivated or the content removed. A recent check, however, showed that the account, likely created in 2025, has resumed disseminating propaganda messages and sermons by jihadi ideologues, including late Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf.
The message was not merely propaganda. It reflected a growing global challenge in which extremist groups exploit digital platforms and weaknesses in digital governance systems to communicate, spread propaganda, recruit followers and project power far beyond the physical battlefield.
At the centre of this challenge is Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), the foundational systems that enable governments and citizens to interact securely and efficiently through digital identity, payments, data exchange and trusted communications. While DPI is often discussed in the context of financial inclusion, service delivery and economic development, security experts increasingly argue that it is also becoming a critical component of national security.
As governments digitise public services and expand connectivity, extremist groups have become more adept at exploiting the same digital ecosystem to influence audiences, spread narratives and evade traditional security responses.
The TikTok video showing the abducted victims from Woro, however, represented more than a propaganda stunt. It highlighted how terrorism itself is evolving in the digital age.
The 90-second video was shared on the Chinese-owned social media platform by a handler identified as Abu Muhammad Abba, a coinage that could be genuine but is more likely a pseudonym, as is common within jihadist circles.
Shortly after the clip went viral in February, both the video and the account disappeared from the platform, suggesting that the account may have been deactivated or the content removed. A recent check, however, showed that the account, likely created in 2025, has resumed disseminating propaganda messages and sermons by jihadi ideologues, including late Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf.
The message was not merely propaganda. It reflected a growing global challenge in which extremist groups exploit digital platforms and weaknesses in digital governance systems to communicate, spread propaganda, recruit followers and project power far beyond the physical battlefield.
At the centre of this challenge is Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), the foundational systems that enable governments and citizens to interact securely and efficiently through digital identity, payments, data exchange and trusted communications. While DPI is often discussed in the context of financial inclusion, service delivery and economic development, security experts increasingly argue that it is also becoming a critical component of national security.
As governments digitise public services and expand connectivity, extremist groups have become more adept at exploiting the same digital ecosystem to influence audiences, spread narratives and evade traditional security responses.
The TikTok video showing the abducted victims from Woro, however, represented more than a propaganda stunt. It highlighted how terrorism itself is evolving in the digital age.
A global digital battlefield
The exploitation of social media by extremist groups is not unique to Nigeria.
From the Islamic State’s sophisticated media machinery to al-Qaeda channels on Telegram and violent far-right networks operating across Europe and North America, terrorist organisations have transformed digital platforms into strategic assets, according to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).
What were originally communication tools have become part of the infrastructure through which extremist groups recruit followers, disseminate propaganda, coordinate activities, raise funds and shape public perception.
“The war is not [only] about guns and bullets again,” said Malik Samuel, a security analyst and senior researcher at Good Governance Africa (GGA). “It is now more of an information warfare.”
Governments around the world have spent years trying to adapt to this reality.
In West Africa, where Islamic State and al-Qaeda franchises wreak havoc in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, regional efforts such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit have largely focused on intelligence sharing, military cooperation and counterterrorism operations on the ground.
In Europe and North America, security agencies increasingly view online propaganda not merely as harmful content but as part of a broader ecosystem capable of facilitating recruitment, radicalisation and operational coordination.
One of the most notable examples emerged in Europe, where coordinated Europol-led operations dismantled key elements of the Islamic State’s online propaganda infrastructure. Rather than focusing solely on individual posts or accounts, investigators targeted the servers, websites, applications and communication systems that enabled extremist content to circulate globally.
These efforts pushed many extremist organisations away from mainstream platforms and into more obscure digital spaces, particularly encrypted Telegram channels, where propaganda networks sustained by automated accounts and sympathisers continue to operate.
Yet the rise of TikTok created new opportunities.
Since TikTok’s rapid global expansion, researchers and law enforcement agencies have documented how extremist actors exploit the platform’s recommendation-driven ecosystem to amplify propaganda and expand their reach.
An Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) report titled ‘CaliphateTok’ identified an active network of at least 20 Islamic State-supporting TikTok accounts that collectively amassed more than one million views. Europol has similarly documented the presence of terrorist and violent extremist content on the platform.
In September 2023, Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) and TikTok coordinated a multinational operation involving 11 countries that identified more than 2,100 pieces of suspected terrorist and violent extremist content, including material linked to jihadist and violent far-right networks.
What distinguishes many Western responses is not the absence of extremist content but the existence of dedicated institutions designed to continuously monitor, analyse and disrupt terrorist online ecosystems.
For example, Europol’s EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU), established in 2015, operates as a permanent capability that tracks extremist propaganda, supports online investigations, works with technology companies to facilitate content removals and maintains databases used in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
In June 2024, Europol, in collaboration with Eurojust and US authorities, dismantled online infrastructure supporting multiple Islamic State media outlets, taking down servers used to distribute propaganda and operational messages in at least 30 languages.
The operation demonstrated how modern counterterrorism increasingly focuses not only on content moderation but on disrupting the digital infrastructure that sustains extremist networks.
The exploitation of social media by extremist groups is not unique to Nigeria.
From the Islamic State’s sophisticated media machinery to al-Qaeda channels on Telegram and violent far-right networks operating across Europe and North America, terrorist organisations have transformed digital platforms into strategic assets, according to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).
What were originally communication tools have become part of the infrastructure through which extremist groups recruit followers, disseminate propaganda, coordinate activities, raise funds and shape public perception.
“The war is not [only] about guns and bullets again,” said Malik Samuel, a security analyst and senior researcher at Good Governance Africa (GGA). “It is now more of an information warfare.”
Governments around the world have spent years trying to adapt to this reality.
In West Africa, where Islamic State and al-Qaeda franchises wreak havoc in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, regional efforts such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit have largely focused on intelligence sharing, military cooperation and counterterrorism operations on the ground.
In Europe and North America, security agencies increasingly view online propaganda not merely as harmful content but as part of a broader ecosystem capable of facilitating recruitment, radicalisation and operational coordination.
One of the most notable examples emerged in Europe, where coordinated Europol-led operations dismantled key elements of the Islamic State’s online propaganda infrastructure. Rather than focusing solely on individual posts or accounts, investigators targeted the servers, websites, applications and communication systems that enabled extremist content to circulate globally.
These efforts pushed many extremist organisations away from mainstream platforms and into more obscure digital spaces, particularly encrypted Telegram channels, where propaganda networks sustained by automated accounts and sympathisers continue to operate.
Yet the rise of TikTok created new opportunities.
Since TikTok’s rapid global expansion, researchers and law enforcement agencies have documented how extremist actors exploit the platform’s recommendation-driven ecosystem to amplify propaganda and expand their reach.
An Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) report titled ‘CaliphateTok’ identified an active network of at least 20 Islamic State-supporting TikTok accounts that collectively amassed more than one million views. Europol has similarly documented the presence of terrorist and violent extremist content on the platform.
In September 2023, Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) and TikTok coordinated a multinational operation involving 11 countries that identified more than 2,100 pieces of suspected terrorist and violent extremist content, including material linked to jihadist and violent far-right networks.
What distinguishes many Western responses is not the absence of extremist content but the existence of dedicated institutions designed to continuously monitor, analyse and disrupt terrorist online ecosystems.
For example, Europol’s EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU), established in 2015, operates as a permanent capability that tracks extremist propaganda, supports online investigations, works with technology companies to facilitate content removals and maintains databases used in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
In June 2024, Europol, in collaboration with Eurojust and US authorities, dismantled online infrastructure supporting multiple Islamic State media outlets, taking down servers used to distribute propaganda and operational messages in at least 30 languages.
The operation demonstrated how modern counterterrorism increasingly focuses not only on content moderation but on disrupting the digital infrastructure that sustains extremist networks.
Nigeria’s emerging digital challenge
Nigeria is not isolated from these global trends.
Over the past decade, the country has made significant investments in DPI. The National Identification Number (NIN), Bank Verification Number (BVN), mobile telecommunications networks, and expanding digital government services have laid the foundations for a rapidly digitising society.
Yet, while Nigeria’s digital infrastructure has expanded, questions remain about whether equivalent investments have been made in the systems required to secure that ecosystem against emerging threats.
The growing presence of extremist actors on TikTok and other social media platforms illustrates the challenge.
For years, insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), relied on intermediaries, clandestine websites and tightly controlled channels to disseminate messages about battlefield activities and ideological positions.
That model is changing. Platforms such as TikTok allow armed groups to bypass traditional gatekeepers and communicate directly with followers, potential recruits, local communities, victims and even the state itself.
As the platform becomes increasingly embedded in Nigeria’s digital ecosystem, experts say its misuse by extremist actors raises broader questions about how DPI intersects with national security.
Joseph Ekong, a researcher and security analyst at Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN), said while the use of technology in counterterrorism is important, the willingness of the Nigerian government to treat “early-warning and early-response systems as public infrastructure rather than ad-hoc, donor-driven projects” is also vital.
Nigeria is not isolated from these global trends.
Over the past decade, the country has made significant investments in DPI. The National Identification Number (NIN), Bank Verification Number (BVN), mobile telecommunications networks, and expanding digital government services have laid the foundations for a rapidly digitising society.
Yet, while Nigeria’s digital infrastructure has expanded, questions remain about whether equivalent investments have been made in the systems required to secure that ecosystem against emerging threats.
The growing presence of extremist actors on TikTok and other social media platforms illustrates the challenge.
For years, insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), relied on intermediaries, clandestine websites and tightly controlled channels to disseminate messages about battlefield activities and ideological positions.
That model is changing. Platforms such as TikTok allow armed groups to bypass traditional gatekeepers and communicate directly with followers, potential recruits, local communities, victims and even the state itself.
As the platform becomes increasingly embedded in Nigeria’s digital ecosystem, experts say its misuse by extremist actors raises broader questions about how DPI intersects with national security.
Joseph Ekong, a researcher and security analyst at Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN), said while the use of technology in counterterrorism is important, the willingness of the Nigerian government to treat “early-warning and early-response systems as public infrastructure rather than ad-hoc, donor-driven projects” is also vital.
The algorithm advantage
TikTok’s design—fast-paced, algorithm-driven and highly engaging—makes it particularly susceptible to misuse.
Like many major social media platforms, it relies heavily on recommendation systems to surface content to users. However, the platform’s short-form video format and highly responsive recommendation engine can rapidly amplify content beyond an account’s existing followers, exposing videos to large audiences quickly. This amplification effect allows propaganda to travel far beyond its intended audience.
A single video, even if removed within hours, can be downloaded, reshared and repackaged across multiple accounts, creating a ripple effect that is difficult to contain. The video of the abducted Woro victims offers an example. While the clip disappeared from the main suspected insurgent account, copies remain accessible on several associated handles.
In this way, content moderation often becomes reactive while dissemination remains proactive.
For experts, this illustrates a broader challenge. As social media platforms become embedded within national information ecosystems, security institutions must contend not only with physical threats but also with algorithmically amplified influence operations.
Suggesting a response, Mr Samuel said the Nigerian government, particularly the Office of the National Security Adviser, could “work with social media companies” to shut down extremist or terrorist accounts. He, however, believes that the approach alone will not solve the problem, as groups can easily migrate to alternative platforms or create replacement accounts.
TikTok’s design—fast-paced, algorithm-driven and highly engaging—makes it particularly susceptible to misuse.
Like many major social media platforms, it relies heavily on recommendation systems to surface content to users. However, the platform’s short-form video format and highly responsive recommendation engine can rapidly amplify content beyond an account’s existing followers, exposing videos to large audiences quickly. This amplification effect allows propaganda to travel far beyond its intended audience.
A single video, even if removed within hours, can be downloaded, reshared and repackaged across multiple accounts, creating a ripple effect that is difficult to contain. The video of the abducted Woro victims offers an example. While the clip disappeared from the main suspected insurgent account, copies remain accessible on several associated handles.
In this way, content moderation often becomes reactive while dissemination remains proactive.
For experts, this illustrates a broader challenge. As social media platforms become embedded within national information ecosystems, security institutions must contend not only with physical threats but also with algorithmically amplified influence operations.
Suggesting a response, Mr Samuel said the Nigerian government, particularly the Office of the National Security Adviser, could “work with social media companies” to shut down extremist or terrorist accounts. He, however, believes that the approach alone will not solve the problem, as groups can easily migrate to alternative platforms or create replacement accounts.
A shifting paradigm
The use of TikTok was initially more common among terror groups with no clear political motive, locally known as bandits.
During the course of this report, PREMIUM TIMES monitored and profiled more than 20 accounts, including some allegedly operated by bandits associated with the camp of notorious kingpin Ado Alieru.
More recently, however, Boko Haram factions appear to have adopted similar tactics.
This newspaper identified at least two accounts associated with Boko Haram factions. An independent researcher, who requested anonymity because of security concerns, linked one of the accounts to a faction led by Bakura Doro in the Lake Chad region.
“It started with bandits,” Bulama Bukarti, a lawyer and security analyst, said in an X post. “Now, Boko Haram members are hosting live TikTok shows—spreading propaganda, justifying their violence, and threatening anyone who dares speak against them.”
Mr Bukarti said the insurgents engage with viewers in real time, fielding questions, responding to comments and cultivating a disturbing sense of virtual community.
“Some of their pre-recorded videos have hundreds of thousands of views,” he added. “At this rate, it’s only a matter of time before they start livestreaming attacks.”
Noting that Nigerian intelligence agencies cannot track every terrorist, the lawyer advised that authorities work with TikTok to “shut down terrorist and bandit accounts.”
The use of TikTok was initially more common among terror groups with no clear political motive, locally known as bandits.
During the course of this report, PREMIUM TIMES monitored and profiled more than 20 accounts, including some allegedly operated by bandits associated with the camp of notorious kingpin Ado Alieru.
More recently, however, Boko Haram factions appear to have adopted similar tactics.
This newspaper identified at least two accounts associated with Boko Haram factions. An independent researcher, who requested anonymity because of security concerns, linked one of the accounts to a faction led by Bakura Doro in the Lake Chad region.
“It started with bandits,” Bulama Bukarti, a lawyer and security analyst, said in an X post. “Now, Boko Haram members are hosting live TikTok shows—spreading propaganda, justifying their violence, and threatening anyone who dares speak against them.”
Mr Bukarti said the insurgents engage with viewers in real time, fielding questions, responding to comments and cultivating a disturbing sense of virtual community.
“Some of their pre-recorded videos have hundreds of thousands of views,” he added. “At this rate, it’s only a matter of time before they start livestreaming attacks.”
Noting that Nigerian intelligence agencies cannot track every terrorist, the lawyer advised that authorities work with TikTok to “shut down terrorist and bandit accounts.”
A system struggling to respond
Nigeria’s response to this evolving threat has been uneven.
Responsibility for digital security is spread across multiple institutions, including law enforcement agencies, intelligence services and communications regulators. While several coordination mechanisms already exist, researchers and policymakers have repeatedly identified challenges relating to information sharing, overlapping mandates and inter-agency cooperation.
While several agencies monitor aspects of cybercrime, terrorism and online activity, there is no public information about a dedicated, integrated framework for tracking extremist content across platforms in real time or for systematically analysing digital threat patterns across institutions.
This fragmentation mirrors broader challenges within Nigeria’s security architecture, where intelligence is often siloed, and institutional coordination can be slow.
The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) did not respond to requests for comment sent by PREMIUM TIMES. However, during a press briefing last year, Adamu Laka, the centre’s Director-General, disclosed that the government was partnering with social media platforms to identify and remove terrorist-linked accounts.
The disclosure suggests that authorities recognise the growing digital dimension of terrorism. Data obtained from TikTok’s transparency portal showed that the platform received 33 takedown requests from the Nigerian government between January 2023 and the first two quarters of 2025. This included 24 content posted by 55 accounts, among which 30 were “actioned” upon for violating community guidelines and local laws.
However, experts argue that account removals alone cannot address the wider challenge.
Mr Samuel believes that simply taking down accounts may offer only temporary relief. Instead, he said the government should engage knowledgeable clerics and credible community voices to provide alternative narratives through the same platforms terrorists are using.
Automated moderation tools often struggle with local languages and dialects. Human moderation capacity for African content also remains limited, creating gaps that can be exploited by violent actors.
To address this challenge, Mr Samuel recommended greater collaboration with indigenous technology companies that possess a stronger linguistic and cultural understanding of local contexts.
Nigeria’s response to this evolving threat has been uneven.
Responsibility for digital security is spread across multiple institutions, including law enforcement agencies, intelligence services and communications regulators. While several coordination mechanisms already exist, researchers and policymakers have repeatedly identified challenges relating to information sharing, overlapping mandates and inter-agency cooperation.
While several agencies monitor aspects of cybercrime, terrorism and online activity, there is no public information about a dedicated, integrated framework for tracking extremist content across platforms in real time or for systematically analysing digital threat patterns across institutions.
This fragmentation mirrors broader challenges within Nigeria’s security architecture, where intelligence is often siloed, and institutional coordination can be slow.
The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) did not respond to requests for comment sent by PREMIUM TIMES. However, during a press briefing last year, Adamu Laka, the centre’s Director-General, disclosed that the government was partnering with social media platforms to identify and remove terrorist-linked accounts.
The disclosure suggests that authorities recognise the growing digital dimension of terrorism. Data obtained from TikTok’s transparency portal showed that the platform received 33 takedown requests from the Nigerian government between January 2023 and the first two quarters of 2025. This included 24 content posted by 55 accounts, among which 30 were “actioned” upon for violating community guidelines and local laws.
However, experts argue that account removals alone cannot address the wider challenge.
Mr Samuel believes that simply taking down accounts may offer only temporary relief. Instead, he said the government should engage knowledgeable clerics and credible community voices to provide alternative narratives through the same platforms terrorists are using.
Automated moderation tools often struggle with local languages and dialects. Human moderation capacity for African content also remains limited, creating gaps that can be exploited by violent actors.
To address this challenge, Mr Samuel recommended greater collaboration with indigenous technology companies that possess a stronger linguistic and cultural understanding of local contexts.
Influence, recruitment and radicalisation
The use of TikTok is not only about broadcasting attacks, but it also raises concerns about influence and recruitment.
Short-form videos are easy to consume and share, making them effective tools for shaping narratives. Over time, repeated exposure to such content, even in diluted or coded forms, can normalise extremist ideas or desensitise audiences to violence.
For younger users, who make up a significant portion of TikTok’s audience in Nigeria, this presents a subtle but serious risk.
Delusional and subtle messages posted by the terrorists could drive frustrated, jobless young people into their ranks, according to Mr Samuel.
Unlike traditional recruitment, which often required physical networks, digital pathways are diffuse and harder to detect. A user may encounter a video, follow a handle, and gradually be drawn into more private or encrypted spaces where deeper engagement occurs.
However, the issue of identity is also key. Nigeria has invested heavily in NIN as the country’s foundational identity system. But how does that translate into digital platform accountability? Can terrorist-linked digital accounts be traced through stronger identity verification systems? Can social platforms work with governments without violating privacy rights? Can digital identity systems support lawful, rights-based security monitoring?
These are difficult but necessary questions, as analysts believe that without trusted identity layers across the digital ecosystem, anonymity becomes a weapon for violent actors.
The use of TikTok is not only about broadcasting attacks, but it also raises concerns about influence and recruitment.
Short-form videos are easy to consume and share, making them effective tools for shaping narratives. Over time, repeated exposure to such content, even in diluted or coded forms, can normalise extremist ideas or desensitise audiences to violence.
For younger users, who make up a significant portion of TikTok’s audience in Nigeria, this presents a subtle but serious risk.
Delusional and subtle messages posted by the terrorists could drive frustrated, jobless young people into their ranks, according to Mr Samuel.
Unlike traditional recruitment, which often required physical networks, digital pathways are diffuse and harder to detect. A user may encounter a video, follow a handle, and gradually be drawn into more private or encrypted spaces where deeper engagement occurs.
However, the issue of identity is also key. Nigeria has invested heavily in NIN as the country’s foundational identity system. But how does that translate into digital platform accountability? Can terrorist-linked digital accounts be traced through stronger identity verification systems? Can social platforms work with governments without violating privacy rights? Can digital identity systems support lawful, rights-based security monitoring?
These are difficult but necessary questions, as analysts believe that without trusted identity layers across the digital ecosystem, anonymity becomes a weapon for violent actors.
The governance gap
At the heart of the issue is a digital governance gap.
Nigeria has yet to fully align its security strategy with the realities of a digitised threat environment. Policies exist—notably the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act, and the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, which criminalise [online] terrorist activity, including propaganda, recruitment, and coordination. However, these frameworks are not specifically designed for the speed, scale, and algorithmic nature of platforms like TikTok.
Implementation remains fragmented. Institutional coordination is weak, and technical capacity is limited. Existing laws provide a basis for enforcement, but there is no dedicated, integrated policy framework focused on real-time monitoring, platform accountability, and cross-agency digital intelligence operations.
This gap is not just about regulation, it is about readiness, Mr Ekong said.
Without systems to monitor, analyse, and respond to online threats in a coordinated manner, the state remains a step behind actors who are increasingly agile and adaptive, exploiting both policy blind spots and enforcement delays.
At the heart of the issue is a digital governance gap.
Nigeria has yet to fully align its security strategy with the realities of a digitised threat environment. Policies exist—notably the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act, and the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, which criminalise [online] terrorist activity, including propaganda, recruitment, and coordination. However, these frameworks are not specifically designed for the speed, scale, and algorithmic nature of platforms like TikTok.
Implementation remains fragmented. Institutional coordination is weak, and technical capacity is limited. Existing laws provide a basis for enforcement, but there is no dedicated, integrated policy framework focused on real-time monitoring, platform accountability, and cross-agency digital intelligence operations.
This gap is not just about regulation, it is about readiness, Mr Ekong said.
Without systems to monitor, analyse, and respond to online threats in a coordinated manner, the state remains a step behind actors who are increasingly agile and adaptive, exploiting both policy blind spots and enforcement delays.
By Yakubu Mohammed, Premium Times
Tuesday, June 16, 2026
Vidoe - Nigeria says nearly 10,000 former Boko Haram fighters have been reintegrated
Authorities in Nigeria's northeastern Borno State say nearly 10,000 former Boko Haram fighters have now been reintegrated into society under a government-backed rehabilitation and deradicalisation programme aimed at encouraging defections from insurgent groups.
The announcement came as 720 former militants graduated from a rehabilitation centre in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, during a ceremony attended by state officials. According to Borno authorities, the latest group brings the total number of former insurgents reintegrated into their communities to 9,680.
The programme forms part of broader efforts by Nigerian authorities to weaken jihadist groups operating in the Lake Chad region by encouraging fighters to surrender and return to civilian life. Images from the ceremony showed hundreds of former militants gathered at the rehabilitation centre, where participants took an oath before being formally discharged from the programme.
Boko Haram's insurgency, which began more than a decade ago in northeastern Nigeria, has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Although the group's capabilities have been significantly reduced by military operations, armed factions continue to carry out attacks in parts of the region.
Borno State authorities say rehabilitation and reintegration programmes remain an important component of efforts to end the conflict and promote long-term stability in communities affected by the insurgency.
The announcement came as 720 former militants graduated from a rehabilitation centre in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, during a ceremony attended by state officials. According to Borno authorities, the latest group brings the total number of former insurgents reintegrated into their communities to 9,680.
The programme forms part of broader efforts by Nigerian authorities to weaken jihadist groups operating in the Lake Chad region by encouraging fighters to surrender and return to civilian life. Images from the ceremony showed hundreds of former militants gathered at the rehabilitation centre, where participants took an oath before being formally discharged from the programme.
Boko Haram's insurgency, which began more than a decade ago in northeastern Nigeria, has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Although the group's capabilities have been significantly reduced by military operations, armed factions continue to carry out attacks in parts of the region.
Borno State authorities say rehabilitation and reintegration programmes remain an important component of efforts to end the conflict and promote long-term stability in communities affected by the insurgency.
Monday, June 15, 2026
Video - Nigerian on course to decentralize policing system
The Nigerian parliament has passed a constitutional amendment bill aimed at decentralizing the country’s security architecture through the creation of state-level police forces. The long-debated reform now requires approval from at least two-thirds of the country’s state assemblies before it can be forwarded to President Bola Tinubu for assent. Lawmakers say the proposal marks a significant step toward addressing a worsening insecurity situation across the country.
Video - Nigeria intensifies fight against growing security threats
Nigeria continues to grapple with a range of security challenges, including terrorism, kidnapping and banditry, despite ongoing military and intelligence operations. Authorities say security forces are stepping up both operational and intelligence-led responses while expanding cooperation with international partners in an effort to improve security across the country.
Friday, June 12, 2026
President Tinubu says 13,000 Terrorists Neutralized in past year
Nigeria has killed more than 13,000 "terrorists" in the past year, President Bola Tinubu said Friday, adding that the death toll from the country's jihadist insurgency is down 81 percent since he took power in 2023.
"Over 13,000 terrorists have been neutralised in the past year," Tinubu said, without specifying if he meant in 2025 or in the previous 12 months.
He also said that over "124,000 fighters and dependents have laid down their arms since 2023 through Operation Safe Corridor".
Africa's most populous country is fighting a long-running jihadist insurgency across its northern regions, complicated by inroads made by militants from the Sahel, and non-ideological "bandit" gangs.
The insurgency, which has spawned multiple armed groups, has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions since it began in 2009 with an uprising by the jihadist group Boko Haram.
The crisis has also been compounded by violent farmer-herder clashes in parts of the northeast and central regions, while secessionist agitation rumbles on in the southeast, and rampant kidnappings for ransom plague the country's northwest and central regions.
The unrest is inching closer to the relatively safer southwest, where more than 40 students and teachers were seized from their schools in the state of Oyo in May.
"Over 13,000 terrorists have been neutralised in the past year," Tinubu said, without specifying if he meant in 2025 or in the previous 12 months.
He also said that over "124,000 fighters and dependents have laid down their arms since 2023 through Operation Safe Corridor".
Africa's most populous country is fighting a long-running jihadist insurgency across its northern regions, complicated by inroads made by militants from the Sahel, and non-ideological "bandit" gangs.
The insurgency, which has spawned multiple armed groups, has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions since it began in 2009 with an uprising by the jihadist group Boko Haram.
The crisis has also been compounded by violent farmer-herder clashes in parts of the northeast and central regions, while secessionist agitation rumbles on in the southeast, and rampant kidnappings for ransom plague the country's northwest and central regions.
The unrest is inching closer to the relatively safer southwest, where more than 40 students and teachers were seized from their schools in the state of Oyo in May.
Thursday, June 11, 2026
US-Nigeria joint operations eliminate over 200 terrorists in northeast
The US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Nigerian military have killed more than 200 terrorists in joint operations targeting Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in northeastern Nigeria, the two sides said Wednesday.
"AFRICOM, in continued coordination with Nigeria, conducted operations against ISIS (Daesh) fighters in NE Nigeria," AFRICOM said in a post on the US social media platform X. "The targeted operations eliminated more than 200 terrorists, including (ISIS leader) Abu-Bilal al-Minuki. No U.S. or Nigerian forces were harmed."
Nigerian Defense Headquarters spokesperson Samaila Mohammed Uba said the joint operations had significantly degraded terrorist networks in the region, with strikes targeting militant hideouts, logistics bases and operational infrastructure.
Uba confirmed that over 200 terrorists had been killed in the operations and noted that this partnership has also enhanced the Nigerian security forces’ capabilities in intelligence-driven operations, surveillance and reconnaissance.
Nigeria has faced a prolonged insurgency in its northeast for over a decade, largely driven by extremist groups such as Boko Haram and its splinter faction, ISWAP. The conflict has led to tens of thousands of deaths and displaced millions, particularly in states like Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.
By Rabia İclal Turan, AA
"AFRICOM, in continued coordination with Nigeria, conducted operations against ISIS (Daesh) fighters in NE Nigeria," AFRICOM said in a post on the US social media platform X. "The targeted operations eliminated more than 200 terrorists, including (ISIS leader) Abu-Bilal al-Minuki. No U.S. or Nigerian forces were harmed."
Nigerian Defense Headquarters spokesperson Samaila Mohammed Uba said the joint operations had significantly degraded terrorist networks in the region, with strikes targeting militant hideouts, logistics bases and operational infrastructure.
Uba confirmed that over 200 terrorists had been killed in the operations and noted that this partnership has also enhanced the Nigerian security forces’ capabilities in intelligence-driven operations, surveillance and reconnaissance.
Nigeria has faced a prolonged insurgency in its northeast for over a decade, largely driven by extremist groups such as Boko Haram and its splinter faction, ISWAP. The conflict has led to tens of thousands of deaths and displaced millions, particularly in states like Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.
Tuesday, June 9, 2026
High hopes as Nigeria-U.S. pact shifts global counter-terrorism to Sahel
The global war against terrorism is entering a new phase, and Africa has become its central battlefield following recent happenings in the fight against terror in Nigeria.
Security developments indicate that the United States is increasingly redirecting its counter-terrorism operations from the Middle East to Africa, with Nigeria emerging as a critical strategic ally in the expanding offensive against ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates operating across the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.
For years, the epicentre of global terrorism was concentrated in Iraq and Syria, but intelligence assessments now point to a dramatic geographic shift.
ISIS leadership structures are believed to have migrated into the Lake Chad region, while Al-Qaeda-linked groups have entrenched themselves across the Sahel, turning parts of West and Central Africa into one of the world’s most volatile terror corridors.
Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria have borne the brunt of the insurgents’ migration, but worsening political instability in the region, evidenced by military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger Republic, has deeply fractured regional cooperation and weakened coordinated responses to terrorism.
Now, observers believe that Washington appears determined to prevent the region from slipping further into extremist control.
The U.S. believes that ungoverned spaces in Africa allow groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda to build bases for external operations targeting America.
Also, beyond security, the U.S. seeks to ensure access to critical resources, such as high-quality crude oil from the Gulf of Guinea and minerals in nearby regions, which serve as alternatives to Middle Eastern or Chinese-dominated supply chains, while equally trying to suppress Chinese and Russian interests in the region.
Security sources said the region is witnessing an unprecedented escalation of American military engagement, including sustained air operations targeting ISIS strongholds around Lake Chad.
The renewed offensive mirrors earlier American tactics used in the Middle East.
For instance, in 2019, the United States deployed a B-52 bomber to obliterate an ISIS logistics and training base hidden on an island in Iraq’s Tigris River, dropping over 36,000 kilograms of bombs and wiping the enclave off the map.
Similar counter-terrorism intensity is unfolding in Africa following the recent joint U.S.-Nigeria military operations, which struck terrorist enclaves in Sokoto during the 2025 Christmas period and later in Metele, Borno State, where airstrikes allegedly eliminated ISIS global deputy leader, Al-Minuk.
The operations mark a major turning point in Abuja’s security partnership with Washington.
Nigeria, once viewed in Washington with deep suspicion over allegations of human rights abuses and governance concerns, has gradually rebuilt diplomatic trust through intelligence sharing, strategic military cooperation and counter-terrorism coordination.
Military sources said troops recorded fresh gains against Boko Haram and ISWAP fighters in the North-East and the Lake Chad Islands, with several insurgent commanders neutralised in recent offensives.
For Nigeria, the expanding U.S. military footprint, while appearing on the surface to appease the Trump administration’s Christian evangelical base through claims that American involvement is aimed at preventing Christian persecution, also serves a broader strategic purpose. It provides Washington with a critical entry point for monitoring the evolving and adaptive insurgency landscape across the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, which directly threatens U.S. interests in the region and, potentially, the homeland itself.
Notwithstanding the military victories, Nigeria’s internal security crisis has continued to deepen.
Across the country, kidnappings for ransom have continued to surge alarmingly.
Schools, markets, worship centres and highways are increasingly under siege, while communal clashes, separatist agitation, banditry, herder-farmer conflicts and economic sabotage continue to destabilise several regions.
According to a Corporate Security & Risk Management Professional/Regional Security Adviser, Austen Pabor, terrorism and extremism have gone side-by-side with the same outcomes over the years, resulting in armed conflicts and extensive wreckage across the globe, with the United States playing the role it plays to restore stability in these affected countries.
“This shift in global counter-terrorism attention toward Africa reflects how threats can evolve and where the threat is evolving. For Nigeria, this presents an opportunity to strengthen intelligence sharing, regional security cooperation, and counter-terrorism capabilities, provided the country views it through this lens and takes advantage of the potential relationships.
“However, military action alone will not secure lasting stability in Nigeria. The real solution lies in combining targeted security operations with stronger border management, effective governance, disruption of terrorist financing, and the restoration of state authority in underserved communities,” he suggested, adding that terrorist groups thrive where governance is weak.
Pabor stated that sustainable security must focus on both defeating the threat and eliminating the conditions that allow it to regenerate.
“I am hopeful that if the Nigerian government explores the pros of this possibility, where intelligence, surveillance, border strengthening, etc., are shared with the common goal of combating terrorism, it will certainly be a conversation on the front burner,” he said.
Also, security expert, Matthew Ibadin, agreed with the assessment that most of the insecurity challenges are coming from the Sahel region.
This, he attributed to porous borders. According to him, the Nigerian border in the Sahel is porous, making it easy for the terrorists to migrate into the country.
He argued that even if all the country’s military might were deployed to the Sahel, they would not be able to contain the terrorists pouring into the country as a result of porous borders.
“It is time for the Nigerian government to fortify our borders and dismantle the current security architecture in the country.
“This is because we are operating under a single-digit security architecture, where the police are on the exclusive list. The federal government owns the police, so we have a centralised police force. It means that the federal government owns the army, navy, air and the police,” he pointed out.
He explained that it would be difficult to fix the security challenges without devolving power. According to him, that is the only way out of the quagmire.
Ibadin said: “We should allow state police by taking policing from the exclusive list to the concurrent list. Let state governments be able to formulate and undertake policing tasks in their states, so we can hold state governors accountable when there are issues in their states.
Arguing that the police can combat insecurity, Ibadin stressed that the police, if properly empowered, trained, and equipped, could do the job of fighting pervasive insecurity effectively.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has reportedly announced the closure of its ‘hijrah’ migration routes for foreign fighters, acknowledging that traditional entry corridors into Nigeria have become too dangerous due to sustained military operations by United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Nigerian forces.
According to an intelligence report from security analysts covering the Lake Chad region, the terrorist group reportedly acknowledged that the routes, which have historically served as vital channels for the movement of fighters, weapons, supplies, and external support into insurgent-controlled territories, are now considered inaccessible.
Security sources described this development as evidence of increasing pressure on the group’s logistics infrastructure. The restriction on those corridors, they said, could complicate the terrorist organisation’s recruitment, logistics, and operational planning.
The closure of migration routes is believed to be the result of the intelligence-led strikes targeting ISWAP command structures and supply chains across Borno State and the wider Lake Chad region. Experts said this campaign should be sustained.
For a security analyst and digital communications expert, Deji Adesogan, the increasing shift of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts from the Middle East to Africa positions Nigeria as a key strategic partner in the fight against ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin.
This development, he said, could enhance Nigeria’s security through improved intelligence sharing, military cooperation, and access to advanced technology, helping to combat Boko Haram, ISWAP, and other extremist groups.
“Improved security could also boost economic development by attracting investment, restoring agricultural activities, and promoting regional stability. However, Nigeria may also face increased terrorist threats as extremist groups adapt to growing pressure.
“To maximise the benefits, Nigeria must complement military operations with investments in technology, innovation, education, job creation, and good governance to address the root causes of extremism and build long-term national stability,” he said.
A security expert, Abubakar Sadeeq, said, “First, before development, there must be peace. In any situation where crises take the lead, development will be very, very scarce, because how do you even develop when there is no peace?”
Sadeeq blamed insecurity in Nigeria and in the Sahel on the former colonial master. He accused them of using insecurity to exploit the resources of Africa.
“You should know that without Africa’s resources, places like France cannot survive, places like Europe cannot survive. So, there must be crises. Those are factors that are creating this insecurity.
“And Libya is just a next-door neighbour where there was a crisis. And after the crisis, there was no proper resolution to cover the movement of arms. Those arms were deployed into some parts of Africa, here, Nigeria, to be precise.
“So, those are the major factors. And until we have those factors curtailed by having a serious strategy, bringing all security experts together to draft a strategy, of course, there will not be peace.
By Joseph Onyekwere and Johnson Eyiangho, The Guardian
Security developments indicate that the United States is increasingly redirecting its counter-terrorism operations from the Middle East to Africa, with Nigeria emerging as a critical strategic ally in the expanding offensive against ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates operating across the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.
For years, the epicentre of global terrorism was concentrated in Iraq and Syria, but intelligence assessments now point to a dramatic geographic shift.
ISIS leadership structures are believed to have migrated into the Lake Chad region, while Al-Qaeda-linked groups have entrenched themselves across the Sahel, turning parts of West and Central Africa into one of the world’s most volatile terror corridors.
Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria have borne the brunt of the insurgents’ migration, but worsening political instability in the region, evidenced by military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger Republic, has deeply fractured regional cooperation and weakened coordinated responses to terrorism.
Now, observers believe that Washington appears determined to prevent the region from slipping further into extremist control.
The U.S. believes that ungoverned spaces in Africa allow groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda to build bases for external operations targeting America.
Also, beyond security, the U.S. seeks to ensure access to critical resources, such as high-quality crude oil from the Gulf of Guinea and minerals in nearby regions, which serve as alternatives to Middle Eastern or Chinese-dominated supply chains, while equally trying to suppress Chinese and Russian interests in the region.
Security sources said the region is witnessing an unprecedented escalation of American military engagement, including sustained air operations targeting ISIS strongholds around Lake Chad.
The renewed offensive mirrors earlier American tactics used in the Middle East.
For instance, in 2019, the United States deployed a B-52 bomber to obliterate an ISIS logistics and training base hidden on an island in Iraq’s Tigris River, dropping over 36,000 kilograms of bombs and wiping the enclave off the map.
Similar counter-terrorism intensity is unfolding in Africa following the recent joint U.S.-Nigeria military operations, which struck terrorist enclaves in Sokoto during the 2025 Christmas period and later in Metele, Borno State, where airstrikes allegedly eliminated ISIS global deputy leader, Al-Minuk.
The operations mark a major turning point in Abuja’s security partnership with Washington.
Nigeria, once viewed in Washington with deep suspicion over allegations of human rights abuses and governance concerns, has gradually rebuilt diplomatic trust through intelligence sharing, strategic military cooperation and counter-terrorism coordination.
Military sources said troops recorded fresh gains against Boko Haram and ISWAP fighters in the North-East and the Lake Chad Islands, with several insurgent commanders neutralised in recent offensives.
For Nigeria, the expanding U.S. military footprint, while appearing on the surface to appease the Trump administration’s Christian evangelical base through claims that American involvement is aimed at preventing Christian persecution, also serves a broader strategic purpose. It provides Washington with a critical entry point for monitoring the evolving and adaptive insurgency landscape across the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, which directly threatens U.S. interests in the region and, potentially, the homeland itself.
Notwithstanding the military victories, Nigeria’s internal security crisis has continued to deepen.
Across the country, kidnappings for ransom have continued to surge alarmingly.
Schools, markets, worship centres and highways are increasingly under siege, while communal clashes, separatist agitation, banditry, herder-farmer conflicts and economic sabotage continue to destabilise several regions.
According to a Corporate Security & Risk Management Professional/Regional Security Adviser, Austen Pabor, terrorism and extremism have gone side-by-side with the same outcomes over the years, resulting in armed conflicts and extensive wreckage across the globe, with the United States playing the role it plays to restore stability in these affected countries.
“This shift in global counter-terrorism attention toward Africa reflects how threats can evolve and where the threat is evolving. For Nigeria, this presents an opportunity to strengthen intelligence sharing, regional security cooperation, and counter-terrorism capabilities, provided the country views it through this lens and takes advantage of the potential relationships.
“However, military action alone will not secure lasting stability in Nigeria. The real solution lies in combining targeted security operations with stronger border management, effective governance, disruption of terrorist financing, and the restoration of state authority in underserved communities,” he suggested, adding that terrorist groups thrive where governance is weak.
Pabor stated that sustainable security must focus on both defeating the threat and eliminating the conditions that allow it to regenerate.
“I am hopeful that if the Nigerian government explores the pros of this possibility, where intelligence, surveillance, border strengthening, etc., are shared with the common goal of combating terrorism, it will certainly be a conversation on the front burner,” he said.
Also, security expert, Matthew Ibadin, agreed with the assessment that most of the insecurity challenges are coming from the Sahel region.
This, he attributed to porous borders. According to him, the Nigerian border in the Sahel is porous, making it easy for the terrorists to migrate into the country.
He argued that even if all the country’s military might were deployed to the Sahel, they would not be able to contain the terrorists pouring into the country as a result of porous borders.
“It is time for the Nigerian government to fortify our borders and dismantle the current security architecture in the country.
“This is because we are operating under a single-digit security architecture, where the police are on the exclusive list. The federal government owns the police, so we have a centralised police force. It means that the federal government owns the army, navy, air and the police,” he pointed out.
He explained that it would be difficult to fix the security challenges without devolving power. According to him, that is the only way out of the quagmire.
Ibadin said: “We should allow state police by taking policing from the exclusive list to the concurrent list. Let state governments be able to formulate and undertake policing tasks in their states, so we can hold state governors accountable when there are issues in their states.
Arguing that the police can combat insecurity, Ibadin stressed that the police, if properly empowered, trained, and equipped, could do the job of fighting pervasive insecurity effectively.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has reportedly announced the closure of its ‘hijrah’ migration routes for foreign fighters, acknowledging that traditional entry corridors into Nigeria have become too dangerous due to sustained military operations by United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Nigerian forces.
According to an intelligence report from security analysts covering the Lake Chad region, the terrorist group reportedly acknowledged that the routes, which have historically served as vital channels for the movement of fighters, weapons, supplies, and external support into insurgent-controlled territories, are now considered inaccessible.
Security sources described this development as evidence of increasing pressure on the group’s logistics infrastructure. The restriction on those corridors, they said, could complicate the terrorist organisation’s recruitment, logistics, and operational planning.
The closure of migration routes is believed to be the result of the intelligence-led strikes targeting ISWAP command structures and supply chains across Borno State and the wider Lake Chad region. Experts said this campaign should be sustained.
For a security analyst and digital communications expert, Deji Adesogan, the increasing shift of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts from the Middle East to Africa positions Nigeria as a key strategic partner in the fight against ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin.
This development, he said, could enhance Nigeria’s security through improved intelligence sharing, military cooperation, and access to advanced technology, helping to combat Boko Haram, ISWAP, and other extremist groups.
“Improved security could also boost economic development by attracting investment, restoring agricultural activities, and promoting regional stability. However, Nigeria may also face increased terrorist threats as extremist groups adapt to growing pressure.
“To maximise the benefits, Nigeria must complement military operations with investments in technology, innovation, education, job creation, and good governance to address the root causes of extremism and build long-term national stability,” he said.
A security expert, Abubakar Sadeeq, said, “First, before development, there must be peace. In any situation where crises take the lead, development will be very, very scarce, because how do you even develop when there is no peace?”
Sadeeq blamed insecurity in Nigeria and in the Sahel on the former colonial master. He accused them of using insecurity to exploit the resources of Africa.
“You should know that without Africa’s resources, places like France cannot survive, places like Europe cannot survive. So, there must be crises. Those are factors that are creating this insecurity.
“And Libya is just a next-door neighbour where there was a crisis. And after the crisis, there was no proper resolution to cover the movement of arms. Those arms were deployed into some parts of Africa, here, Nigeria, to be precise.
“So, those are the major factors. And until we have those factors curtailed by having a serious strategy, bringing all security experts together to draft a strategy, of course, there will not be peace.
Friday, May 29, 2026
Islamic State claims first attacks in North-west Nigeria
The Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) has claimed what appears to be its first reported attacks in North-west Nigeria, in which 18 soldiers and a police officer were killed in Kebbi and Sokoto states.
The claims were published in Al-Naba, an Islamic States’ weekly propaganda magazine published on Thursday.
The claims came about six months after United States President Donald Trump ordered airstrikes against those he described as Islamic State elements in the North-west, following his claims of Christian genocide in Nigeria.
However, analysts and security observers remain divided over the footprint of Islamic State in the North-west region.
The claims
According to Al-Naba, ISSP fighters ambushed a patrol team of the Nigerian Army on 28th of Dhul Qadah (15 May) near Runji village in Illela Local Government Area of Sokoto State.
Islamic State claimed that the attack led to a gun battle involving machine guns, during which seven soldiers were killed while others sustained injuries and fled the area.
The terror group added that its fighters burnt a military vehicle and seized eight rifles as well as three machine guns during the encounter.
In Kebbi State, the group said ISSP fighters carried out another ambush earlier in May near Giro Masa village, killing 11 soldiers and a police officer, while injuring others.
According to the Al-Naba publication, the troops were allegedly attacked while attempting to track the fighters in the area.
It also claimed that two military vehicles were destroyed and weapons carted away during the attack.
The claims by the extremist group could not be independently verified as of press time, while Nigerian military authorities are yet to officially comment on the allegations.
However, similar attacks were recorded mid-May in Illela LGA, Sokoto, and Shanga LGA, Kebbi. Both attacks were blamed on Lakurawa, a terror group that has been operating in the region for years.
The latest claims are expected to renew the debate around Lakurawa’s affiliation.
Analysts hold differing opinions regarding the group’s ideological and operational affiliation. While some believe Lakurawa is aligned with an al-Qaeda franchise operating across the Sahel, others argue that the group may instead be operating as a local affiliate of the Islamic State.
The uncertainty surrounding the group’s allegiance has continued to complicate efforts to clearly define the evolving militant landscape in Nigeria’s North-west, where armed banditry, cross-border insurgency and extremist infiltration increasingly overlap.
By Yakubu Mohammed, Premium Times
The claims were published in Al-Naba, an Islamic States’ weekly propaganda magazine published on Thursday.
The claims came about six months after United States President Donald Trump ordered airstrikes against those he described as Islamic State elements in the North-west, following his claims of Christian genocide in Nigeria.
However, analysts and security observers remain divided over the footprint of Islamic State in the North-west region.
The claims
According to Al-Naba, ISSP fighters ambushed a patrol team of the Nigerian Army on 28th of Dhul Qadah (15 May) near Runji village in Illela Local Government Area of Sokoto State.
Islamic State claimed that the attack led to a gun battle involving machine guns, during which seven soldiers were killed while others sustained injuries and fled the area.
The terror group added that its fighters burnt a military vehicle and seized eight rifles as well as three machine guns during the encounter.
In Kebbi State, the group said ISSP fighters carried out another ambush earlier in May near Giro Masa village, killing 11 soldiers and a police officer, while injuring others.
According to the Al-Naba publication, the troops were allegedly attacked while attempting to track the fighters in the area.
It also claimed that two military vehicles were destroyed and weapons carted away during the attack.
The claims by the extremist group could not be independently verified as of press time, while Nigerian military authorities are yet to officially comment on the allegations.
However, similar attacks were recorded mid-May in Illela LGA, Sokoto, and Shanga LGA, Kebbi. Both attacks were blamed on Lakurawa, a terror group that has been operating in the region for years.
The latest claims are expected to renew the debate around Lakurawa’s affiliation.
Analysts hold differing opinions regarding the group’s ideological and operational affiliation. While some believe Lakurawa is aligned with an al-Qaeda franchise operating across the Sahel, others argue that the group may instead be operating as a local affiliate of the Islamic State.
The uncertainty surrounding the group’s allegiance has continued to complicate efforts to clearly define the evolving militant landscape in Nigeria’s North-west, where armed banditry, cross-border insurgency and extremist infiltration increasingly overlap.
Thursday, May 28, 2026
US Report Says 30,000 Armed Fulani Militants Operating Across Nigeria
New report released by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has revealed that about 30,000 armed Fulani militants are currently operating across Nigeria, carrying out deadly attacks, kidnappings and widespread violence that have displaced over 1.3 million people, especially in the country’s Middle Belt region.
The report described the armed groups as one of the most dangerous non-state actors in Nigeria, stressing that their activities have intensified insecurity, deepened humanitarian crises and worsened religious tensions in several parts of the country.
The report stated that attacks linked to the groups have resulted in thousands of deaths, destruction of villages and mass displacement of rural populations over the years.
“An estimated 30,000 Fulani militants likely operate across the country, traditionally concentrating in the country’s northwest, then migrating down through the Middle Belt, and becoming increasingly active in the South. Each group consists of anywhere from 10 to 1,000 members.
“While these militants do not share a centralised leadership, some collaborate on attacks. Violence by Fulani militants caused the highest number of deaths among all religious communities in Nigeria over the last year as compared to attacks by organised insurgent groups and criminal gangs.
“Fulani assailants have not spared Muslims, raiding herders’ cattle and violently attacking non-Fulani Muslim communities. Furthermore, many militants have targeted Christian communities in the Middle Belt and, increasingly, the South, burning homes and churches as well as kidnapping, raping, and murdering.
“Militants often coordinate via radio and utilise motorcycles and automatic weapons, rapidly hitting several targets at once in rural, isolated areas. They often wield machetes and descend on vulnerable communities,” the report said.
The commission estimated that at least 1.3 million people had been displaced by violence associated with the groups, with Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Nasarawa and parts of Niger states among the worst-hit areas.
However, the report cautioned against viewing the violence solely through a religious lens, stressing that the conflict is rooted in multiple overlapping factors.
“The violence associated with Fulani militants is driven by a complex combination of religion, ethnicity, competition over land and water resources, criminality, and environmental degradation,” USCIRF stated.
It added that worsening desertification, population growth and shrinking grazing routes have intensified clashes between nomadic herders and sedentary farming communities across northern and central Nigeria.
The commission further alleged that some militant factions have developed links with criminal gangs and extremist groups operating in the region. “Some Fulani militant groups reportedly collaborate with bandit groups and other armed actors to conduct raids, cattle rustling, kidnappings for ransom, and attacks on civilians,” the report said.
USCIRF criticised the response of Nigerian security agencies, arguing that authorities have struggled to effectively contain the violence despite repeated military deployments and security operations.
“Government authorities have often failed to prevent attacks, respond rapidly to incidents, or hold perpetrators accountable,” the report stated.
According to the commission, the inability to consistently prosecute perpetrators has contributed to a climate of impunity and recurring cycles of violence in affected communities.
The report also cited accusations by some local communities that security responses are sometimes delayed or inadequate, although it acknowledged that Nigerian authorities continue to face enormous operational and logistical challenges in tackling insecurity across multiple fronts.
Despite its criticisms, USCIRF highlighted several efforts undertaken by the Nigerian government to address the crisis. The report referenced increased military operations in parts of the North-central and North-west, expanded intelligence-sharing efforts and the deployment of special security task forces to troubled communities.
It also noted that the administration of President Bola Tinubu had taken steps to strengthen counterterrorism measures and intensify actions against armed groups involved in kidnappings and violent attacks.
Nevertheless, USCIRF maintained that the government’s response has not been sufficient to stem the scale of the violence. “Despite government efforts, attacks by Fulani militants continue with devastating consequences for civilians,” the report stated.
USCIRF argued that persistent violence by both state and non-state actors, including extremist and armed groups, continues to threaten religious communities and undermine stability in Africa’s most populous nation.
“There has been some evidence of increased government efforts, both before and after the October CPC (Country of Particular Concern) designation, to address Fulani-led violence through prosecutions and community-level engagement.
“In September, prosecutors filed initial terrorism charges against nine Fulani herders. All nine defendants, including the alleged organiser of the massacre, Lawal Mohammed Dono Ardo, have reported ties to the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN),” it stated.
The report described the armed groups as one of the most dangerous non-state actors in Nigeria, stressing that their activities have intensified insecurity, deepened humanitarian crises and worsened religious tensions in several parts of the country.
The report stated that attacks linked to the groups have resulted in thousands of deaths, destruction of villages and mass displacement of rural populations over the years.
“An estimated 30,000 Fulani militants likely operate across the country, traditionally concentrating in the country’s northwest, then migrating down through the Middle Belt, and becoming increasingly active in the South. Each group consists of anywhere from 10 to 1,000 members.
“While these militants do not share a centralised leadership, some collaborate on attacks. Violence by Fulani militants caused the highest number of deaths among all religious communities in Nigeria over the last year as compared to attacks by organised insurgent groups and criminal gangs.
“Fulani assailants have not spared Muslims, raiding herders’ cattle and violently attacking non-Fulani Muslim communities. Furthermore, many militants have targeted Christian communities in the Middle Belt and, increasingly, the South, burning homes and churches as well as kidnapping, raping, and murdering.
“Militants often coordinate via radio and utilise motorcycles and automatic weapons, rapidly hitting several targets at once in rural, isolated areas. They often wield machetes and descend on vulnerable communities,” the report said.
The commission estimated that at least 1.3 million people had been displaced by violence associated with the groups, with Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Nasarawa and parts of Niger states among the worst-hit areas.
However, the report cautioned against viewing the violence solely through a religious lens, stressing that the conflict is rooted in multiple overlapping factors.
“The violence associated with Fulani militants is driven by a complex combination of religion, ethnicity, competition over land and water resources, criminality, and environmental degradation,” USCIRF stated.
It added that worsening desertification, population growth and shrinking grazing routes have intensified clashes between nomadic herders and sedentary farming communities across northern and central Nigeria.
The commission further alleged that some militant factions have developed links with criminal gangs and extremist groups operating in the region. “Some Fulani militant groups reportedly collaborate with bandit groups and other armed actors to conduct raids, cattle rustling, kidnappings for ransom, and attacks on civilians,” the report said.
USCIRF criticised the response of Nigerian security agencies, arguing that authorities have struggled to effectively contain the violence despite repeated military deployments and security operations.
“Government authorities have often failed to prevent attacks, respond rapidly to incidents, or hold perpetrators accountable,” the report stated.
According to the commission, the inability to consistently prosecute perpetrators has contributed to a climate of impunity and recurring cycles of violence in affected communities.
The report also cited accusations by some local communities that security responses are sometimes delayed or inadequate, although it acknowledged that Nigerian authorities continue to face enormous operational and logistical challenges in tackling insecurity across multiple fronts.
Despite its criticisms, USCIRF highlighted several efforts undertaken by the Nigerian government to address the crisis. The report referenced increased military operations in parts of the North-central and North-west, expanded intelligence-sharing efforts and the deployment of special security task forces to troubled communities.
It also noted that the administration of President Bola Tinubu had taken steps to strengthen counterterrorism measures and intensify actions against armed groups involved in kidnappings and violent attacks.
Nevertheless, USCIRF maintained that the government’s response has not been sufficient to stem the scale of the violence. “Despite government efforts, attacks by Fulani militants continue with devastating consequences for civilians,” the report stated.
USCIRF argued that persistent violence by both state and non-state actors, including extremist and armed groups, continues to threaten religious communities and undermine stability in Africa’s most populous nation.
“There has been some evidence of increased government efforts, both before and after the October CPC (Country of Particular Concern) designation, to address Fulani-led violence through prosecutions and community-level engagement.
“In September, prosecutors filed initial terrorism charges against nine Fulani herders. All nine defendants, including the alleged organiser of the massacre, Lawal Mohammed Dono Ardo, have reported ties to the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN),” it stated.
By Emmanuel Addeh, Arise News
Wednesday, May 27, 2026
Video - Inside the US's biggest military push in Nigeria in years
Is the US getting into another endless conflict? After promising to pull troops out of Africa, Donald Trump is now ordering military strikes on insurgents in Nigeria. He’s also cut development funding which addressed the causes of terrorism. DW spoke with Cameron Hudson from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who says airstrikes can’t fill the gap.
Monday, May 25, 2026
Nigeria Military Issues Security Alert Ahead of Eid-el-Kabir Celebrations
Nigerian military has warned of possibility of attacks by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists on civilian targets using suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices during next Wednesday’s Eid-el-Kabir celebrations across the North East.
The Headquarters Joint Task Force (North East), Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK) gave the warning in a security advisory ahead of the Eid-el-Kabir celebration on Monday in Maiduguri.
In the security advisory signed by its spokesperson, Lieutenant Colonel Sani Uba, Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK) said the terrorists may target areas of high population concentration during the celebrations.
But the Theatre Command assured the public that these threats have been thoroughly anticipated, hence, troops have been forward deployed to critical and vulnerable locations across all sectors of the Theatre ahead of the celebrations.
It also assured that surveillance and ISR assets have been fully activated, patrols have been intensified, and security forces are operating in close coordination with sister agencies, the CJTF, and community vigilance groups to forestall any threat and guarantee a secure festive period for all residents.
The Theatre Command also listed security guidance that members of the public should observe in the days leading up to and throughout the celebrations
The secirity guidance include conduct of Eid prayers and festivities as close to their homes and familiar localities as possible, avoiding large open gatherings where practicable while exercing heightened vigilance in crowded public spaces such as markets, motor parks, banking halls, and prayer grounds.
The Command also urged members of the public to report any suspicious persons, unattended objects, or unusual movements to the nearest military checkpoint, police station, or civil-military liaison point immediately and to cooperate fully with security personnel during patrols and screening operations.
In addition, members of the public are advised to avoid unnecessary movement, particularly at night or in areas with limited security presence.
The Command also urged the public to refrain from spreading unverified information or rumours capable of causing public panic and instead, rely on official information from verified government and security channels.
“The Theatre Command calls on traditional rulers, religious leaders, media organisations and community stakeholders to actively engage their communities and encourage the timely reporting of credible security information ahead of and during the celebration period. Your cooperation with security forces remains invaluable to the success of ongoing operations.
“Operation HADIN KAI reassures all residents of the North East that troops are on standby, fully prepared, and firmly in control. The Command remains resolute in its determination to deny terrorists any freedom of action and ensure that the Eid El Kabir celebrations proceed in an atmosphere of peace, safety, and dignity for all. The Theatre Command wishes the entire Muslim community a peaceful and rewarding Eid El Kabir celebration,” the statement concluded.
By Ayorinde Oluokun, PM News
The Headquarters Joint Task Force (North East), Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK) gave the warning in a security advisory ahead of the Eid-el-Kabir celebration on Monday in Maiduguri.
In the security advisory signed by its spokesperson, Lieutenant Colonel Sani Uba, Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK) said the terrorists may target areas of high population concentration during the celebrations.
But the Theatre Command assured the public that these threats have been thoroughly anticipated, hence, troops have been forward deployed to critical and vulnerable locations across all sectors of the Theatre ahead of the celebrations.
It also assured that surveillance and ISR assets have been fully activated, patrols have been intensified, and security forces are operating in close coordination with sister agencies, the CJTF, and community vigilance groups to forestall any threat and guarantee a secure festive period for all residents.
The Theatre Command also listed security guidance that members of the public should observe in the days leading up to and throughout the celebrations
The secirity guidance include conduct of Eid prayers and festivities as close to their homes and familiar localities as possible, avoiding large open gatherings where practicable while exercing heightened vigilance in crowded public spaces such as markets, motor parks, banking halls, and prayer grounds.
The Command also urged members of the public to report any suspicious persons, unattended objects, or unusual movements to the nearest military checkpoint, police station, or civil-military liaison point immediately and to cooperate fully with security personnel during patrols and screening operations.
In addition, members of the public are advised to avoid unnecessary movement, particularly at night or in areas with limited security presence.
The Command also urged the public to refrain from spreading unverified information or rumours capable of causing public panic and instead, rely on official information from verified government and security channels.
“The Theatre Command calls on traditional rulers, religious leaders, media organisations and community stakeholders to actively engage their communities and encourage the timely reporting of credible security information ahead of and during the celebration period. Your cooperation with security forces remains invaluable to the success of ongoing operations.
“Operation HADIN KAI reassures all residents of the North East that troops are on standby, fully prepared, and firmly in control. The Command remains resolute in its determination to deny terrorists any freedom of action and ensure that the Eid El Kabir celebrations proceed in an atmosphere of peace, safety, and dignity for all. The Theatre Command wishes the entire Muslim community a peaceful and rewarding Eid El Kabir celebration,” the statement concluded.
By Ayorinde Oluokun, PM News
Related story: Boko Haram kill 33 fishermen, loggers in Nigeria
Friday, May 22, 2026
Pushback in Nigeria over ex-Boko Haram fighter reintegration
Communities in Nigeria's northeast, particularly in Borno state, are grappling with a difficult question: Can those who once took up arms against them truly return and be accepted?
Nigerian officials hope to reintegrate more than 700 former Boko Haram fighters into civilian life under its deradicalization program, Operation Safe Corridor. Authorities say the initiative is key to ending a decade-long conflict. But in communities that have borne the brunt of extremist violence, the policy is reopening wounds that have yet to heal.
The program has been running for years, but each new wave of reintegration continues to spark debate.
Nigeria bets on deradicalization program in North West
Nigerian officials hope to reintegrate more than 700 former Boko Haram fighters into civilian life under its deradicalization program, Operation Safe Corridor. Authorities say the initiative is key to ending a decade-long conflict. But in communities that have borne the brunt of extremist violence, the policy is reopening wounds that have yet to heal.
The program has been running for years, but each new wave of reintegration continues to spark debate.
What is Nigeria's Operation Safe Corridor?
Operation Safe Corridor, launched in 2016, is Nigeria's deradicalization program for former Boko Haram fighters who surrender to the military.
Authorities say it is aimed at encouraging defections and reducing recruitment. Participants undergo screening, deradicalization, psychological counselling and vocational training before being cleared for reintegration.
Over 2,000 individuals have passed through the initiative, according to Nigerian authorities. Officials say only those assessed as "low risk" are released back into society.
Usman Tar, former commissioner for information and internal security in Borno state, which this year saw renewed a violence, told local media: "When they return, there is a screening by the Department of State Services and they're screened by the community leaders."
Authorities say the scheme is working.
"We did not receive any negative report from anybody from any one of them," Abdullahi Sabi Ishaq, special assistant on security to the Borno state government, told local media.
"They were accepted by the community, and we hope this one will also be accepted."
Operation Safe Corridor, launched in 2016, is Nigeria's deradicalization program for former Boko Haram fighters who surrender to the military.
Authorities say it is aimed at encouraging defections and reducing recruitment. Participants undergo screening, deradicalization, psychological counselling and vocational training before being cleared for reintegration.
Over 2,000 individuals have passed through the initiative, according to Nigerian authorities. Officials say only those assessed as "low risk" are released back into society.
Usman Tar, former commissioner for information and internal security in Borno state, which this year saw renewed a violence, told local media: "When they return, there is a screening by the Department of State Services and they're screened by the community leaders."
Authorities say the scheme is working.
"We did not receive any negative report from anybody from any one of them," Abdullahi Sabi Ishaq, special assistant on security to the Borno state government, told local media.
"They were accepted by the community, and we hope this one will also be accepted."
Concerns for violence-weary Nigerian communities
But on the ground, acceptance is far from guaranteed.
In Borno state, some residents like Muhammad Sharif told DW the idea of living alongside former fighters is very unsettling. He suggests former fighters should be relocated away from communities they once attacked and describes the arrangement as "improper."
"If you forgive somebody and you want to integrate him, take him to another local government where the offended people will not see that person at their midst. They will not bring us peace," he told DW.
Abraham Philip said communities are still dealing from trauma, even as the government pushes ahead with the program.
"Yes, peace is taking place also but destruction is also taking place," he told DW, referencing recent attacks, including the Monday Market, the post office and the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital (UMTH) bomb blast in Maiduguri.
Philip says communities have questions for the government, because "a lot of things have been happening. There are some people saying these are the results of the reintegration that has been taking place."
But on the ground, acceptance is far from guaranteed.
In Borno state, some residents like Muhammad Sharif told DW the idea of living alongside former fighters is very unsettling. He suggests former fighters should be relocated away from communities they once attacked and describes the arrangement as "improper."
"If you forgive somebody and you want to integrate him, take him to another local government where the offended people will not see that person at their midst. They will not bring us peace," he told DW.
Abraham Philip said communities are still dealing from trauma, even as the government pushes ahead with the program.
"Yes, peace is taking place also but destruction is also taking place," he told DW, referencing recent attacks, including the Monday Market, the post office and the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital (UMTH) bomb blast in Maiduguri.
Philip says communities have questions for the government, because "a lot of things have been happening. There are some people saying these are the results of the reintegration that has been taking place."
Could reintegrated Boko Haram members relapse?
Others say the issue is not just about reintegration — but whether former fighters have truly changed. For Maiduguri resident Usman Abubakar, the distinction between theory and reality is key.
"In principle, it is a very good idea," he said.
But he adds: "We have had instances where repentant Boko Haram threatened to go back to the bushes when the promises the state government made to them were not fulfilled. That is why I don't want to call them repentant. I want to call them surrendered because you cannot see their mind."
Some Nigerians outside the conflict-affected northeast also remain divided. In Abuja, civil servant Hauwa Ajeje told DW: "It's going to be a vicious cycle. We'll be recycling the same individuals."
Raphael Ogbaji, a student at the University of Abuja, had a more optimistic take: "If they have chosen the path of peace and the path of repentance, why not give them the benefit of the doubt? Every human being can change."
Others say the issue is not just about reintegration — but whether former fighters have truly changed. For Maiduguri resident Usman Abubakar, the distinction between theory and reality is key.
"In principle, it is a very good idea," he said.
But he adds: "We have had instances where repentant Boko Haram threatened to go back to the bushes when the promises the state government made to them were not fulfilled. That is why I don't want to call them repentant. I want to call them surrendered because you cannot see their mind."
Some Nigerians outside the conflict-affected northeast also remain divided. In Abuja, civil servant Hauwa Ajeje told DW: "It's going to be a vicious cycle. We'll be recycling the same individuals."
Raphael Ogbaji, a student at the University of Abuja, had a more optimistic take: "If they have chosen the path of peace and the path of repentance, why not give them the benefit of the doubt? Every human being can change."
Nigerians debate over justice for Boko Haram survivors
Lawyer Ahmed Abubakar told DW reintegration raises serious questions about justice for victims.
"Those that have been affected negatively by the activities of these terrorists, they need restitution," he said, questioning why former fighters are being rehabilitated while many victims are still displaced.
"Some of the victims are still staying in Internally Displaced People's camps. Some have lost their homes and are not getting any form of justice," he said.
While Abubaker acknowledges that international law allows reintegration, he says state authorities have not been clear about who is being reintegrated or their level of involvement in extremist violence.
Lawyer Ahmed Abubakar told DW reintegration raises serious questions about justice for victims.
"Those that have been affected negatively by the activities of these terrorists, they need restitution," he said, questioning why former fighters are being rehabilitated while many victims are still displaced.
"Some of the victims are still staying in Internally Displaced People's camps. Some have lost their homes and are not getting any form of justice," he said.
While Abubaker acknowledges that international law allows reintegration, he says state authorities have not been clear about who is being reintegrated or their level of involvement in extremist violence.
By Chinaza Samuel, DW
Related stories: Video - Nigeria debates reintegration of former Boko Haram fighters
Thursday, May 21, 2026
Boko Haram kill 33 fishermen, loggers in Nigeria
Boko Haram jihadists have killed 33 fishermen and loggers in two attacks in Nigeria’s restive Borno state in the country’s northeast, two sources told AFP Wednesday.
Monday’s attacks killed 27 fishermen in Mafa district and six loggers in Dikwa district, according to an anti-jihadist militia and a fishermen union official in the region.
“The fishermen were intercepted by Boko Haram fighters on motorcycles two kilometres from Mafa town,” Babakura Kolo, an anti-jihadist militia assisting the military said.
“All the 27 fishermen were shot dead,” Kolo said.
They were returning with a catch of lungfish from a dried up pond, said Abdullahi Sani, an official of a fishermen’s union in the state capital Maiduguri, 52 kilometres (32 miles) away.
Sani gave the same figure of 27.
Earlier, six loggers were shot dead by Boko Haram fighters while collecting firewood in the bush outside Malam Maja village in nearby Dikwa district, Kolo said.
They were displaced by jihadist violence and were living in makeshift camps in Dikwa town, 90 kilometres from Maiduguri, Kolo said.
Boko Haram and the rival Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have increasing targeted loggers, farmers, fishermen, herders and metal scrap collectors in the region, accusing them of spying on them and passing on information to the military.
Two weeks ago, Boko Haram fighters shot dead 18 loggers who had gone into the bush outside Abaram village in Borno state’s Bama district, according to anti-jihadist militia and residents.
Tens of thousands have been killed and millions displaced in the 17-year-old insurgency.
Most of the displaced live in makeshift camps, relying on food handouts from international charities.
But with the drying up of aid due to funding cuts, the displaced are left to fend for themselves.
Monday’s attacks killed 27 fishermen in Mafa district and six loggers in Dikwa district, according to an anti-jihadist militia and a fishermen union official in the region.
“The fishermen were intercepted by Boko Haram fighters on motorcycles two kilometres from Mafa town,” Babakura Kolo, an anti-jihadist militia assisting the military said.
“All the 27 fishermen were shot dead,” Kolo said.
They were returning with a catch of lungfish from a dried up pond, said Abdullahi Sani, an official of a fishermen’s union in the state capital Maiduguri, 52 kilometres (32 miles) away.
Sani gave the same figure of 27.
Earlier, six loggers were shot dead by Boko Haram fighters while collecting firewood in the bush outside Malam Maja village in nearby Dikwa district, Kolo said.
They were displaced by jihadist violence and were living in makeshift camps in Dikwa town, 90 kilometres from Maiduguri, Kolo said.
Boko Haram and the rival Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have increasing targeted loggers, farmers, fishermen, herders and metal scrap collectors in the region, accusing them of spying on them and passing on information to the military.
Two weeks ago, Boko Haram fighters shot dead 18 loggers who had gone into the bush outside Abaram village in Borno state’s Bama district, according to anti-jihadist militia and residents.
Tens of thousands have been killed and millions displaced in the 17-year-old insurgency.
Most of the displaced live in makeshift camps, relying on food handouts from international charities.
But with the drying up of aid due to funding cuts, the displaced are left to fend for themselves.
Wednesday, May 20, 2026
Nigerian army says joint US strikes kill 175 ISIL fighters in country’s northeast
Nigerian forces working with the United States claim to have killed 175 ISIL (ISIS) fighters in a series of joint strikes in the country’s northeast in recent days.
The Nigerian Defence Headquarters said on Tuesday that operations conducted with the US military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) destroyed checkpoints, weapons caches, logistics hubs, military equipment and financing networks used by ISIL and the ISIL affiliate in West Africa Province (ISWAP), which has led a years-long struggle in the region.
“As of 19 May 2026, assessments indicate that 175 ISIS terrorists have been eliminated from the battlefield,” Nigerian Defence Headquarters spokesperson Major-General Samaila Uba said in a statement.
“The joint strikes have further reinforced what the Armed Forces of Nigeria have consistently done over the years – hunt down and kill terrorists anywhere they are in Nigeria,” Uba said.
The announcement comes after AFRICOM said it had carried out attacks on Sunday in coordination with the Nigerian government. It also follows Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu reporting that Abu Bilal al-Minuki, described as ISIL’s second-in-command and also known as Abu-Mainok, was killed along with “several of his lieutenants” in a joint Nigeria-US strike.
The Nigerian Army said al-Minuki oversaw key ISIL operations in the Sahel and West African region.
After the announcement of al-Minuki’s death, Tinubu thanked US President Donald Trump in a post on social media for his “leadership and unwavering support”.
“I commend the personnel involved on both sides for their professionalism and courage, and I look forward to more decisive strikes against all terrorist enclaves across the nation,” Tinubu said.
The Nigerian military on Tuesday also reported the killing of another senior fighter, Abd-al Wahhab, who it said was responsible for coordinating attack planning and propaganda for ISWAP, as well as two senior ISWAP members, identified as Abu Musa al-Mangawi and Abu al-Muthanna al-Muhajir.
Since suffering major setbacks in the Middle East, ISIL has pivoted towards Africa, which accounted for 86 percent of the group’s global activity in the first three months of 2026, according to crisis monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.
The US announced it had sent troops to Nigeria in February, in what was deemed a mostly advisory and training role, but the joint operations reported in recent days appear to signal a more active US involvement in the country.
The Nigerian Defence Headquarters said on Tuesday that operations conducted with the US military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) destroyed checkpoints, weapons caches, logistics hubs, military equipment and financing networks used by ISIL and the ISIL affiliate in West Africa Province (ISWAP), which has led a years-long struggle in the region.
“As of 19 May 2026, assessments indicate that 175 ISIS terrorists have been eliminated from the battlefield,” Nigerian Defence Headquarters spokesperson Major-General Samaila Uba said in a statement.
“The joint strikes have further reinforced what the Armed Forces of Nigeria have consistently done over the years – hunt down and kill terrorists anywhere they are in Nigeria,” Uba said.
The announcement comes after AFRICOM said it had carried out attacks on Sunday in coordination with the Nigerian government. It also follows Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu reporting that Abu Bilal al-Minuki, described as ISIL’s second-in-command and also known as Abu-Mainok, was killed along with “several of his lieutenants” in a joint Nigeria-US strike.
The Nigerian Army said al-Minuki oversaw key ISIL operations in the Sahel and West African region.
After the announcement of al-Minuki’s death, Tinubu thanked US President Donald Trump in a post on social media for his “leadership and unwavering support”.
“I commend the personnel involved on both sides for their professionalism and courage, and I look forward to more decisive strikes against all terrorist enclaves across the nation,” Tinubu said.
The Nigerian military on Tuesday also reported the killing of another senior fighter, Abd-al Wahhab, who it said was responsible for coordinating attack planning and propaganda for ISWAP, as well as two senior ISWAP members, identified as Abu Musa al-Mangawi and Abu al-Muthanna al-Muhajir.
Since suffering major setbacks in the Middle East, ISIL has pivoted towards Africa, which accounted for 86 percent of the group’s global activity in the first three months of 2026, according to crisis monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.
The US announced it had sent troops to Nigeria in February, in what was deemed a mostly advisory and training role, but the joint operations reported in recent days appear to signal a more active US involvement in the country.
Monday, May 18, 2026
Nigeria debates reintegration of former Boko Haram fighters
Nigeria’s de-radicalization program for former Boko Haram fighters has sparked divided opinion. Authorities say it offers structured rehabilitation, combining disarmament, counselling and monitoring, to encourage defections and reduce violence. Supporters insist it is not amnesty but a controlled reintegration process aimed at weakening extremist networks and preventing renewed recruitment, but critics argue that it risks undermining justice for victims of the insurgency in the northeast.
Related story: Nigeria bets on deradicalization program in North West
US., Nigerian forces kill top Islamic State leader
U.S. and Nigerian forces killed Islamic State’s alleged No. 2, a man linked to terrorist attacks against religious minorities and the mass kidnapping of schoolchildren, officials said.
Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Mainuki guided Islamic State “on matters relating to media operations, economic warfare and the development and manufacturing of weapons, explosives and drones,” Maj. Gen. Samaila Uba, spokesman for Nigeria’s armed forces, said in a release Saturday.
Al-Mainuki, born in Nigeria in 1982, had also led Islamic State fundraising operations, according to a United Nations report issued last year.
The operation that killed him, which took place in the Lake Chad Basin in northeastern Nigeria, was “a major breakthrough in ongoing efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism” regionally and globally, Uba said.
The U.S. and its allies have for years been killing top leaders of Islamic State and al Qaeda. Officials recognize that new militants step up to take their places, but argue that repeated decapitation blows weaken insurgents’ ability to plan, finance and carry out attacks.
Officials were vague about the role played by each country’s troops in this week’s Nigeria operation, which, according to a U.S. official, included both a ground assault and airstrikes. The U.S. has far greater air-attack capabilities than does Nigeria, and the Pentagon released a video of what appeared to be a devastating strike on an Islamic State position.
President Trump said in a social-media post that “brave American forces and the Armed Forces of Nigeria flawlessly executed a meticulously planned and very complex mission.” Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu said the operation also killed several al-Mainuki lieutenants.
Since establishing a short-lived caliphate in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s, Islamic State has increasingly focused operations in Africa, from the arid expanses of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the west to Somalia in the east. Defense officials believe a Somali, Abdul Qadir Mumin, is now the group’s global leader.
The U.N. reported last year that there were some 8,000 to 12,000 fighters in Islamic State ranks in West Africa, an area also contested by powerful local al Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin.
From its African bases, Islamic State aspires to conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. and European interests at home and overseas, according to American officials.
Al-Mainuki “thought he could hide in Africa, but little did he know we had sources who kept us informed on what he was doing,” Trump wrote.
The coordinated operation reflects the significant warming of U.S.-Nigeria relations since last year, when Trump blamed the Nigerian government’s inaction for what he described as “genocide” of Christians committed by Muslim militants.
At the time, Trump threatened to cut aid to Nigeria and send American troops in “guns-a-blazing” to kill Islamist extremists.
In the rapprochement that followed, the U.S. dispatched hundreds of American troops to train Nigerian forces, including in the complicated tactics of coordinated air-and-infantry operations. The U.S. said at the time that the American troops would provide intelligence on militant targets, but wouldn’t be involved in ground combat.
“Africa is the most important area of operations for Islamic State,” said Hans-Jakob Schindler, the former coordinator of the U.N. Security Council’s panel on Islamic State and al Qaeda. But Nigeria is a particular focus because it involves violence against Christians that resonates with Trump’s political base, Schindler said.
Attuned to Trump’s concerns, the Nigerians made a point Saturday of highlighting al-Mainuki’s role in overseeing attacks against ethnic and religious minorities. Trump made a point of thanking the Nigerian government for its role in the operation.
Al-Mainuki’s extremist roots could be traced back to Boko Haram, a Nigerian militant group infamous for kidnapping children, and he was linked to a 2018 abduction of more than 100 schoolgirls in Nigeria’s Yobe State.
Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Mainuki guided Islamic State “on matters relating to media operations, economic warfare and the development and manufacturing of weapons, explosives and drones,” Maj. Gen. Samaila Uba, spokesman for Nigeria’s armed forces, said in a release Saturday.
Al-Mainuki, born in Nigeria in 1982, had also led Islamic State fundraising operations, according to a United Nations report issued last year.
The operation that killed him, which took place in the Lake Chad Basin in northeastern Nigeria, was “a major breakthrough in ongoing efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism” regionally and globally, Uba said.
The U.S. and its allies have for years been killing top leaders of Islamic State and al Qaeda. Officials recognize that new militants step up to take their places, but argue that repeated decapitation blows weaken insurgents’ ability to plan, finance and carry out attacks.
Officials were vague about the role played by each country’s troops in this week’s Nigeria operation, which, according to a U.S. official, included both a ground assault and airstrikes. The U.S. has far greater air-attack capabilities than does Nigeria, and the Pentagon released a video of what appeared to be a devastating strike on an Islamic State position.
President Trump said in a social-media post that “brave American forces and the Armed Forces of Nigeria flawlessly executed a meticulously planned and very complex mission.” Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu said the operation also killed several al-Mainuki lieutenants.
Since establishing a short-lived caliphate in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s, Islamic State has increasingly focused operations in Africa, from the arid expanses of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the west to Somalia in the east. Defense officials believe a Somali, Abdul Qadir Mumin, is now the group’s global leader.
The U.N. reported last year that there were some 8,000 to 12,000 fighters in Islamic State ranks in West Africa, an area also contested by powerful local al Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin.
From its African bases, Islamic State aspires to conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. and European interests at home and overseas, according to American officials.
Al-Mainuki “thought he could hide in Africa, but little did he know we had sources who kept us informed on what he was doing,” Trump wrote.
The coordinated operation reflects the significant warming of U.S.-Nigeria relations since last year, when Trump blamed the Nigerian government’s inaction for what he described as “genocide” of Christians committed by Muslim militants.
At the time, Trump threatened to cut aid to Nigeria and send American troops in “guns-a-blazing” to kill Islamist extremists.
In the rapprochement that followed, the U.S. dispatched hundreds of American troops to train Nigerian forces, including in the complicated tactics of coordinated air-and-infantry operations. The U.S. said at the time that the American troops would provide intelligence on militant targets, but wouldn’t be involved in ground combat.
“Africa is the most important area of operations for Islamic State,” said Hans-Jakob Schindler, the former coordinator of the U.N. Security Council’s panel on Islamic State and al Qaeda. But Nigeria is a particular focus because it involves violence against Christians that resonates with Trump’s political base, Schindler said.
Attuned to Trump’s concerns, the Nigerians made a point Saturday of highlighting al-Mainuki’s role in overseeing attacks against ethnic and religious minorities. Trump made a point of thanking the Nigerian government for its role in the operation.
Al-Mainuki’s extremist roots could be traced back to Boko Haram, a Nigerian militant group infamous for kidnapping children, and he was linked to a 2018 abduction of more than 100 schoolgirls in Nigeria’s Yobe State.
By Benoit Faucon and Michael M. Phillips, WSJ
How ISWAP and Boko Haram are reshaping the Lake Chad Basin
The killing of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, the second-in-command of ISIL (ISIS), by United States and Nigerian forces marks a notable achievement for “counterterrorism”. Yet for analysts observing the Lake Chad Basin, it highlights how persistent and complex insecurity in the region has become.
Al-Minuki, a Nigerian national from Borno State, was operating out of a compound near Lake Chad, at the centre of one of the world’s most active armed group theatres.
His choice of northeastern Nigeria as a base underscores the conditions driving a renewed surge of violence by both the ISIL affiliate in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and its rival, Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS), more widely known as Boko Haram.
Perhaps equally significant is the parallel resurgence of Boko Haram, which quietly rebuilt itself while security agencies primarily focused on the more dominant ISWAP.
“While regional forces focused on countering ISWAP’s threats, partly due to the group’s advanced drone capabilities, Boko Haram appears to have taken advantage of the relative attention on its rival to regroup,” Nimi Princewill, a security expert in the Sahel, told Al Jazeera. “This, in turn, seems to have enabled both factions to rebuild strength and carry out further attacks in the area.”
By Mubarak Aliyu, Al Jazeera
Al-Minuki, a Nigerian national from Borno State, was operating out of a compound near Lake Chad, at the centre of one of the world’s most active armed group theatres.
His choice of northeastern Nigeria as a base underscores the conditions driving a renewed surge of violence by both the ISIL affiliate in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and its rival, Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS), more widely known as Boko Haram.
Perhaps equally significant is the parallel resurgence of Boko Haram, which quietly rebuilt itself while security agencies primarily focused on the more dominant ISWAP.
“While regional forces focused on countering ISWAP’s threats, partly due to the group’s advanced drone capabilities, Boko Haram appears to have taken advantage of the relative attention on its rival to regroup,” Nimi Princewill, a security expert in the Sahel, told Al Jazeera. “This, in turn, seems to have enabled both factions to rebuild strength and carry out further attacks in the area.”
Borders, weak governance, and violence spike
Beyond the immediate tactical manoeuvre of Boko Haram and ISWAP, the resurgence of violence in the Lake Chad Basin also underscores the broader regional challenges of coordination and intelligence-sharing among affected states.
“Although Mali and Nigeria do not share a common border, the large expanse of the Sahel that straddles them has several porous borders that allow the movement of jihadi elements and their weapons. The situation in Mali has made the Sahel a more permissive environment for armed groups, amplifying risks for Nigeria through spillover dynamics,” Kabir Amadu, managing director of Beacon Security and Intelligence Limited in Nigeria, told Al Jazeera.
Meanwhile, efforts by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to harmonise military operations are frequently hampered by logistical bottlenecks, differing command structures, and uneven resource allocation, allowing armed groups to exploit gaps along porous borders.
Local communities, on the other hand, face the dual pressures of insecurity and humanitarian deprivation, often relying on informal networks for protection and sustenance, which can inadvertently provide concealment or mobility corridors for armed rebels. Humanitarian agencies report that civilians are increasingly caught in cycles of displacement and forced recruitment, while regional security forums struggle to implement preventative measures that go beyond episodic military interventions.
In some areas, fear, mistrust, and weakened traditional authority structures may make communities more vulnerable to coercion or influence by armed groups. These social pressures can create conditions that Boko Haram and ISWAP may be able to exploit.
Economic factors also seem to play a notable role in the resurgence of both groups. Control of the Lake Chad islands could provide authority over taxation routes, smuggling corridors, and resource extraction, turning the islands into potentially lucrative areas of competition that extend beyond purely ideological motives.
Beyond the immediate tactical manoeuvre of Boko Haram and ISWAP, the resurgence of violence in the Lake Chad Basin also underscores the broader regional challenges of coordination and intelligence-sharing among affected states.
“Although Mali and Nigeria do not share a common border, the large expanse of the Sahel that straddles them has several porous borders that allow the movement of jihadi elements and their weapons. The situation in Mali has made the Sahel a more permissive environment for armed groups, amplifying risks for Nigeria through spillover dynamics,” Kabir Amadu, managing director of Beacon Security and Intelligence Limited in Nigeria, told Al Jazeera.
Meanwhile, efforts by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to harmonise military operations are frequently hampered by logistical bottlenecks, differing command structures, and uneven resource allocation, allowing armed groups to exploit gaps along porous borders.
Local communities, on the other hand, face the dual pressures of insecurity and humanitarian deprivation, often relying on informal networks for protection and sustenance, which can inadvertently provide concealment or mobility corridors for armed rebels. Humanitarian agencies report that civilians are increasingly caught in cycles of displacement and forced recruitment, while regional security forums struggle to implement preventative measures that go beyond episodic military interventions.
In some areas, fear, mistrust, and weakened traditional authority structures may make communities more vulnerable to coercion or influence by armed groups. These social pressures can create conditions that Boko Haram and ISWAP may be able to exploit.
Economic factors also seem to play a notable role in the resurgence of both groups. Control of the Lake Chad islands could provide authority over taxation routes, smuggling corridors, and resource extraction, turning the islands into potentially lucrative areas of competition that extend beyond purely ideological motives.
Violence mechanics
This combination of armed activity and criminal enterprise also appears to support how the groups sustain themselves. Boko Haram’s mix of ideological and criminal operations, including robbery and kidnapping, may help fund its activities while attracting disaffected youth. Recruitment seems influenced by the region’s fragile socioeconomic conditions, including high poverty and unemployment, rather than ideology alone.
The shortcomings of reintegration programmes are also considered to contribute to the problem, with former combatants rejoining Boko Haram after facing limited life prospects. ISS research found that former ISWAP members, who would face execution for deserting their group, were joining Boko Haram’s Ghazwah wing in Borno, notorious for robbery and ransom operations.
In addition to financial and operational factors, the groups exploit gaps in local governance and security presence to consolidate influence. Remote communities often experience inconsistent law enforcement, limited state services, and weak administrative oversight, creating spaces where armed groups can operate with relative impunity.
“ISWAP and Boko Haram have become active again in the Lake Chad Basin for three main reasons: their resilience and ability to adapt to the evolving tactics of the Nigerian armed forces; the lucrative economy of violence that sustains their funding and manpower; and the Nigerian state’s limited ability to establish a legitimate, lasting presence in the region that could undermine their credibility,” Chris Ogunmodede, a Nigerian political analyst, told Al Jazeera.
This combination of armed activity and criminal enterprise also appears to support how the groups sustain themselves. Boko Haram’s mix of ideological and criminal operations, including robbery and kidnapping, may help fund its activities while attracting disaffected youth. Recruitment seems influenced by the region’s fragile socioeconomic conditions, including high poverty and unemployment, rather than ideology alone.
The shortcomings of reintegration programmes are also considered to contribute to the problem, with former combatants rejoining Boko Haram after facing limited life prospects. ISS research found that former ISWAP members, who would face execution for deserting their group, were joining Boko Haram’s Ghazwah wing in Borno, notorious for robbery and ransom operations.
In addition to financial and operational factors, the groups exploit gaps in local governance and security presence to consolidate influence. Remote communities often experience inconsistent law enforcement, limited state services, and weak administrative oversight, creating spaces where armed groups can operate with relative impunity.
“ISWAP and Boko Haram have become active again in the Lake Chad Basin for three main reasons: their resilience and ability to adapt to the evolving tactics of the Nigerian armed forces; the lucrative economy of violence that sustains their funding and manpower; and the Nigerian state’s limited ability to establish a legitimate, lasting presence in the region that could undermine their credibility,” Chris Ogunmodede, a Nigerian political analyst, told Al Jazeera.
Beyond military reach
Many of the factors driving armed attacks in the Lake Chad Basin are unlikely to be solved by military operations alone. The conditions that give ISWAP and Boko Haram their recruitment base, logistical support, and social legitimacy in some communities can be traced to decades of poverty, displacement, governance gaps, and political exclusion.
Data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) shows the region hosts 2.9 million internally displaced people, including 2.3 million in Nigeria. Violence has forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the Lake Chad Basin, while humanitarian actors received just 19 percent of the funding required for 2025.
“ISWAP and Boko Haram’s recent resurgence reflects not simply a military setback, but a deepening governance vacuum across the Lake Chad Basin,” Abiola Sadiq, a security consultant, told Al Jazeera.
The Lake Chad Basin continues to face overlapping crises: millions remain displaced, schools are closed, and humanitarian aid is insufficient. Armed groups exploit geographic and administrative gaps to expand operations, while regional security cooperation struggles to keep pace with their adaptability.
“While the reported killing of ISIL leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki may temporarily disrupt command structures, it is also likely to trigger retaliatory violence as rival jihadist factions compete for relevance, legitimacy, and territorial influence,” said Sadiq.
In the weeks following the strike, intelligence reports recorded a surge in small-scale attacks and cross-border raids, indicating that operational fragmentation has not diminished the groups’ capacity to coordinate assaults. Civilians continue to face restricted movement and elevated risks of recruitment, extortion, and displacement.
“With Nigeria’s 2027 general elections approaching, these groups are highly likely to intensify their operations, potentially extending attacks beyond their traditional strongholds in the Lake Chad Basin and northeastern Nigeria,” said Sadiq.
Many of the factors driving armed attacks in the Lake Chad Basin are unlikely to be solved by military operations alone. The conditions that give ISWAP and Boko Haram their recruitment base, logistical support, and social legitimacy in some communities can be traced to decades of poverty, displacement, governance gaps, and political exclusion.
Data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) shows the region hosts 2.9 million internally displaced people, including 2.3 million in Nigeria. Violence has forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the Lake Chad Basin, while humanitarian actors received just 19 percent of the funding required for 2025.
“ISWAP and Boko Haram’s recent resurgence reflects not simply a military setback, but a deepening governance vacuum across the Lake Chad Basin,” Abiola Sadiq, a security consultant, told Al Jazeera.
The Lake Chad Basin continues to face overlapping crises: millions remain displaced, schools are closed, and humanitarian aid is insufficient. Armed groups exploit geographic and administrative gaps to expand operations, while regional security cooperation struggles to keep pace with their adaptability.
“While the reported killing of ISIL leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki may temporarily disrupt command structures, it is also likely to trigger retaliatory violence as rival jihadist factions compete for relevance, legitimacy, and territorial influence,” said Sadiq.
In the weeks following the strike, intelligence reports recorded a surge in small-scale attacks and cross-border raids, indicating that operational fragmentation has not diminished the groups’ capacity to coordinate assaults. Civilians continue to face restricted movement and elevated risks of recruitment, extortion, and displacement.
“With Nigeria’s 2027 general elections approaching, these groups are highly likely to intensify their operations, potentially extending attacks beyond their traditional strongholds in the Lake Chad Basin and northeastern Nigeria,” said Sadiq.
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