A week after the Sadiku-led Boko Haram faction
killed and abducted more than 170 women and children from Woro in Kaiama, Kwara State, the terror group released a video on TikTok mocking the government and accusing it of “deceit and infidelity” for
downplaying the number of kidnapped victims.
The 90-second video was shared on the Chinese-owned social media platform by a handler identified as Abu Muhammad Abba, a coinage that could be genuine but is more likely a pseudonym, as is common within jihadist circles.
Shortly after the clip went viral in February, both the video and the account disappeared from the platform, suggesting that the account may have been deactivated or the content removed. A recent check, however, showed that the account, likely created in 2025, has resumed disseminating propaganda messages and sermons by jihadi ideologues, including late Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf.
The message was not merely propaganda. It reflected a growing global challenge in which extremist groups exploit digital platforms and weaknesses in digital governance systems to communicate, spread propaganda, recruit followers and project power far beyond the physical battlefield.
At the centre of this challenge is Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), the foundational systems that enable governments and citizens to interact securely and efficiently through digital identity, payments, data exchange and trusted communications. While DPI is often discussed in the context of financial inclusion, service delivery and economic development, security experts increasingly argue that it is also becoming a critical component of national security.
As governments digitise public services and expand connectivity, extremist groups have become more adept at exploiting the same digital ecosystem to influence audiences, spread narratives and evade traditional security responses.
The TikTok video showing the abducted victims from Woro, however, represented more than a propaganda stunt. It highlighted how terrorism itself is evolving in the digital age.
A global digital battlefieldThe exploitation of social media by extremist groups is not unique to Nigeria.
From the Islamic State’s sophisticated media machinery to al-Qaeda channels on Telegram and violent far-right networks operating across Europe and North America, terrorist organisations have transformed digital platforms into strategic assets, according to the
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).What were originally communication tools have become part of the infrastructure through which extremist groups recruit followers, disseminate propaganda, coordinate activities, raise funds and shape public perception.
“The war is not [only] about guns and bullets again,” said Malik Samuel, a security analyst and senior researcher at Good Governance Africa (GGA). “It is now more of an information warfare.”
Governments around the world have spent years trying to adapt to this reality.
In West Africa, where Islamic State and al-Qaeda franchises wreak havoc in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, regional efforts such as the
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit have largely focused on intelligence sharing, military cooperation and counterterrorism operations on the ground.
In Europe and North America, security agencies increasingly view online propaganda not merely as harmful content but as part of a broader ecosystem capable of facilitating recruitment, radicalisation and operational coordination.
One of the most notable examples emerged in Europe, where coordinated Europol-led operations
dismantled key elements of the Islamic State’s online propaganda infrastructure. Rather than focusing solely on individual posts or accounts, investigators targeted the servers, websites, applications and communication systems that enabled extremist content to circulate globally.
These efforts pushed many extremist organisations away from mainstream platforms and into more obscure digital spaces, particularly encrypted Telegram channels, where propaganda networks sustained by automated accounts and sympathisers continue to operate.
Yet the rise of TikTok created new opportunities.
Since TikTok’s rapid global expansion, researchers and law enforcement agencies have documented how extremist actors exploit the platform’s recommendation-driven ecosystem to amplify propaganda and expand their reach.
An Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) report titled ‘CaliphateTok’ identified an active network of at least 20 Islamic State-supporting TikTok accounts that collectively amassed more than one million views. Europol has similarly documented the presence of terrorist and violent extremist content on the platform.
In September 2023, Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) and TikTok coordinated a multinational
operation involving 11 countries that identified more than 2,100 pieces of suspected terrorist and violent extremist content, including material linked to jihadist and violent far-right networks.
What distinguishes many Western responses is not the absence of extremist content but the existence of dedicated institutions designed to continuously monitor, analyse and disrupt terrorist online ecosystems.
For example, Europol’s EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU), established in 2015, operates as a permanent capability that tracks extremist propaganda, supports online investigations, works with technology companies to facilitate content removals and maintains databases used in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
In June 2024, Europol, in collaboration with Eurojust and US authorities,
dismantled online infrastructure supporting multiple Islamic State media outlets, taking down servers used to distribute propaganda and operational messages in at least 30 languages.
The operation demonstrated how modern counterterrorism increasingly focuses not only on content moderation but on disrupting the digital infrastructure that sustains extremist networks.
Nigeria’s emerging digital challenge
Nigeria is not isolated from these global trends.
Over the past decade, the country has made significant investments in DPI. The National Identification Number (NIN), Bank Verification Number (BVN), mobile telecommunications networks, and expanding digital government services have laid the foundations for a rapidly digitising society.
Yet, while Nigeria’s digital infrastructure has expanded, questions remain about whether equivalent investments have been made in the systems required to secure that ecosystem against emerging threats.
The growing presence of extremist actors on TikTok and other social media platforms illustrates the challenge.
For years, insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), relied on intermediaries, clandestine websites and tightly controlled channels to disseminate messages about battlefield activities and ideological positions.
That model is changing. Platforms such as TikTok allow armed groups to bypass traditional gatekeepers and communicate directly with followers, potential recruits, local communities, victims and even the state itself.
As the platform becomes increasingly embedded in Nigeria’s digital ecosystem, experts say its misuse by extremist actors raises broader questions about how DPI intersects with national security.
Joseph Ekong, a researcher and security analyst at Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN), said while the use of technology in counterterrorism is important, the willingness of the Nigerian government to treat “early-warning and early-response systems as public infrastructure rather than ad-hoc, donor-driven projects” is also vital.
The algorithm advantage
TikTok’s design—fast-paced, algorithm-driven and highly engaging—makes it particularly susceptible to misuse.
Like many major social media platforms, it relies heavily on recommendation systems to surface content to users. However, the platform’s short-form video format and highly responsive recommendation engine can rapidly amplify content beyond an account’s existing followers, exposing videos to large audiences quickly. This amplification effect allows propaganda to travel far beyond its intended audience.
A single video, even if removed within hours, can be downloaded, reshared and repackaged across multiple accounts, creating a ripple effect that is difficult to contain. The video of the abducted Woro victims offers an example. While the clip disappeared from the main suspected insurgent account, copies remain accessible on several associated handles.
In this way, content moderation often becomes reactive while dissemination remains proactive.
For experts, this illustrates a broader challenge. As social media platforms become embedded within national information ecosystems, security institutions must contend not only with physical threats but also with algorithmically amplified influence operations.
Suggesting a response, Mr Samuel said the Nigerian government, particularly the Office of the National Security Adviser, could “work with social media companies” to shut down extremist or terrorist accounts. He, however, believes that the approach alone will not solve the problem, as groups can easily migrate to alternative platforms or create replacement accounts.
A shifting paradigmThe use of TikTok was initially more common among terror groups with no clear political motive, locally known as bandits.
During the course of this report, PREMIUM TIMES monitored and profiled more than 20 accounts, including some allegedly operated by bandits associated with the camp of notorious kingpin Ado Alieru.
More recently, however, Boko Haram factions appear to have adopted similar tactics.
This newspaper identified at least two accounts associated with Boko Haram factions. An independent researcher, who requested anonymity because of security concerns, linked one of the accounts to a faction led by Bakura Doro in the Lake Chad region.
“It started with bandits,” Bulama Bukarti, a lawyer and security analyst,
said in an X post. “Now, Boko Haram members are hosting live TikTok shows—spreading propaganda, justifying their violence, and threatening anyone who dares speak against them.”
Mr Bukarti said the insurgents engage with viewers in real time, fielding questions, responding to comments and cultivating a disturbing sense of virtual community.
“Some of their pre-recorded videos have hundreds of thousands of views,” he added. “At this rate, it’s only a matter of time before they start livestreaming attacks.”
Noting that Nigerian intelligence agencies cannot track every terrorist, the lawyer advised that authorities work with TikTok to “shut down terrorist and bandit accounts.”
A system struggling to respondNigeria’s response to this evolving threat has been uneven.
Responsibility for digital security is spread across multiple institutions, including law enforcement agencies, intelligence services and communications regulators. While several coordination mechanisms already exist, researchers and policymakers have repeatedly identified challenges relating to information sharing, overlapping mandates and inter-agency cooperation.
While several agencies monitor aspects of cybercrime, terrorism and online activity, there is no public information about a dedicated, integrated framework for tracking extremist content across platforms in real time or for systematically analysing digital threat patterns across institutions.
This fragmentation mirrors broader challenges within Nigeria’s security architecture, where intelligence is often siloed, and institutional coordination can be slow.
The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) did not respond to requests for comment sent by PREMIUM TIMES. However, during a press briefing last year, Adamu Laka, the centre’s Director-General, disclosed that the government was
partnering with social media platforms to identify and remove terrorist-linked accounts.
The disclosure suggests that authorities recognise the growing digital dimension of terrorism. Data obtained from TikTok’s transparency portal showed that the platform received 33 takedown requests from the Nigerian government between January 2023 and the first two quarters of 2025. This included 24 content posted by 55 accounts, among which 30 were “actioned” upon for violating community guidelines and local laws.
However, experts argue that account removals alone cannot address the wider challenge.
Mr Samuel believes that simply taking down accounts may offer only temporary relief. Instead, he said the government should engage knowledgeable clerics and credible community voices to provide alternative narratives through the same platforms terrorists are using.
Automated moderation tools often struggle with local languages and dialects. Human moderation capacity for African content also
remains limited, creating gaps that can be exploited by violent actors.
To address this challenge, Mr Samuel recommended greater collaboration with indigenous technology companies that possess a stronger linguistic and cultural understanding of local contexts.
Influence, recruitment and radicalisation
The use of TikTok is not only about broadcasting attacks, but it also raises concerns about influence and recruitment.
Short-form videos are easy to consume and share, making them effective tools for shaping narratives. Over time, repeated exposure to such content, even in diluted or coded forms, can normalise extremist ideas or desensitise audiences to violence.
For younger users, who make up a significant portion of TikTok’s audience in Nigeria, this presents a subtle but serious risk.
Delusional and subtle messages posted by the terrorists could drive frustrated, jobless young people into their ranks, according to Mr Samuel.
Unlike traditional recruitment, which often required physical networks, digital pathways are diffuse and harder to detect. A user may encounter a video, follow a handle, and gradually be drawn into more private or encrypted spaces where deeper engagement occurs.
However, the issue of identity is also key. Nigeria has invested heavily in NIN as the country’s foundational identity system. But how does that translate into digital platform accountability? Can terrorist-linked digital accounts be traced through stronger identity verification systems? Can social platforms work with governments without violating privacy rights? Can digital identity systems support lawful, rights-based security monitoring?
These are difficult but necessary questions, as analysts believe that without trusted identity layers across the digital ecosystem, anonymity becomes a weapon for violent actors.
The governance gap
At the heart of the issue is a digital governance gap.
Nigeria has yet to fully align its security strategy with the realities of a digitised threat environment. Policies exist—notably the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act, and the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, which criminalise [online] terrorist activity, including propaganda, recruitment, and coordination. However, these frameworks are not specifically designed for the speed, scale, and algorithmic nature of platforms like TikTok.
Implementation remains fragmented. Institutional coordination is weak, and technical capacity is limited. Existing laws provide a basis for enforcement, but there is no dedicated, integrated policy framework focused on real-time monitoring, platform accountability, and cross-agency digital intelligence operations.
This gap is not just about regulation, it is about readiness, Mr Ekong said.
Without systems to monitor, analyse, and respond to online threats in a coordinated manner, the state remains a step behind actors who are increasingly agile and adaptive, exploiting both policy blind spots and enforcement delays.
