The Nigerian Navy and Federal Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture (FDFA) arrested 33 people, including three Chinese nationals, in late August as part of a three-day initiative known as Exercise Coastal Grip II and Operation Abo Eja.
It was not immediately clear what the Chinese nationals did on the vessels, but Chinese fishing captains have committed illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea for decades. Also arrested were two Ghanaians and 28 Nigerians. Chinese captains routinely hire African workers.
The operation involved naval ships, helicopters, Special Boat Service personnel and maritime surveillance assets, and was coordinated through the Western Naval Command Mission Control Centre, Nigeria’s Channels Television reported. Fisheries officials offered technical guidance.
“The Operation has demonstrated the importance of maintaining a strong presence at sea, as regular and credible surveillance creates deterrent and encourages compliance amongst the legitimate operators and provides the authorities with valuable information on the activities taking place on the Nigerian maritime jurisdictions,” Adeleke Adegoke, FDFA deputy director, said in a Radio Nigeria report.
After the arrests, Nigerian Navy Rear Adm. Abubakar Mustapha told reporters that IUU fishing has reduced the country’s fish stocks to the extent that it now imports more than 70% of its “fishery needs.”
“So, the partnership between the Nigerian Navy and the [FDFA] is a step in the right direction,” Mustapha said in a Channels Television report. “In fact, the days of illegal fishers and poachers are numbered because the intersection of security, which the Navy brings, and regulation, which the [FDFA] brings to the table, would translate to the denial of these criminal activities, and which will also translate to more revenue and more food security.”
Nigeria loses about $70 million annually to illegal fishing perpetrated by a host of foreign fleets. Beijing commands the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleet and is the world’s worst illegal fishing offender, according to the IUU Fishing Risk Index. Due mostly to illegal Chinese fishing vessels, West Africa has become the world’s epicenter for IUU fishing. It costs the region an estimated $10 billion a year, according to a Stimson Center think tank report.
Chinese vessels commit many fishing violations, including bottom trawling, which involves dragging a net along the sea floor, indiscriminately scooping up marine life. This kills juvenile fish, decimates fish stocks and destroys ecosystems.
Beijing’s vessels also commonly fish illegally in countries’ exclusive economic zones and abuse local rules to enter African fishing registries under local flags. This is known as flagging in, or flying a flag of convenience. It helps a vessel’s owners dodge financial charges and other regulations.
Beijing recently refused to sign the Mombasa Declaration, an agreement meant to improve efforts to combat illegal fishing in East Africa. Steve Trent, CEO and co-founder of the Environmental Justice Foundation, said the Chinese government has taken a disingenuous approach regarding its fishing fleet.
“It’s simply not credible for them to carry on in this way,” Trent told the BBC in July. “China, to date, still is not doing nearly enough to control its fleet. In fact, I would say they’re enabling it, through subsidies, through a lack of oversight and control.”
Nigeria and other West African nations are collaborating to halt illegal fishing. On June 1, the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) was established to address IUU fishing and other regional sea crimes. Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone joined Nigeria in signing the pact. The CMTF will be the first joint, African-led maritime security effort to include a rapid response force.
The force will be headquartered in Lagos and is expected to conduct intelligence, interdiction, patrols, surveillance, search and rescue missions, and other security operations. According to the Institute for Security Studies, Nigeria is the only country so far to contribute to the fleet, with one helicopter, two vans, two pickup trucks, three ships and three military trucks. The force will work closely with the West Africa Regional Maritime Security Center and the Central African Regional Maritime Safety Center.
Wednesday, September 16, 2026
Beyond Drug Seizures: What Nigeria’s Meth Labs Reveal About the Flow of Transnational Crime
The recent discovery of covert methamphetamine laboratories in southwestern Nigeria should not be viewed simply as another successful drug raid. Instead, these operations provide a glimpse into an emerging reality, revealing a fundamental shift in how transnational criminal organizations are actively adapting their production models, expanding their geographic footprint, and embedding themselves deeper within West Africa.
In June 2026, Nigeria’s National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) uncovered an industrial-scale methamphetamine laboratory hidden within a forested area of Oyo State, arresting a Mexican national alongside four Nigerian accomplices. The operation came only weeks after authorities dismantled a Nigerian-Mexican methamphetamine syndicate operating another clandestine laboratory in Ogun State, resulting in the arrest of three Mexican nationals and six Nigerians.
The presence of foreign meth “cooks” operating in Nigeria is particularly significant. It shows that criminal networks are not merely using West Africa as a transit corridor for narcotics, but increasingly as a production hub. This shift suggests a deliberate strategy: relocating portions of the drug manufacturing chain closer to the markets, exploiting areas perceived as lower-risk operating environments, and diversifying logistics networks to improve concealment from law enforcement. If drug production can occur in Africa to supply both the African and European markets, it reduces the maritime visibility of the supply chains. Precursor chemicals can come from other parts of the world, complicating patterns of maritime drug enforcement in the region that have been working to improve their effectiveness in recent years and testing the legislation of coastal states.
The maritime dimension of this shift deserves closer scrutiny. The move from trafficking finished products across oceans to producing drugs closer to destination markets does not make the maritime angle disappear; it changes what security agencies and authorities need to detect. A laboratory hidden inland may have no obvious narcotics signature at the port, yet the production chain will still depend on the movement of raw material or precursor chemicals, equipment, solvents, financing and other inputs across borders. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has documented how precursor chemicals can enter West Africa through commercial channels and then be relocated to the site that is most logistically convenient, complicating efforts to differentiate between legitimate commerce and illicit diversion. Nigeria’s current enforcement experience also shows how central the maritime domain remains: in June and July 2026, NDLEA reported major seizures at Lagos ports involving containers that had moved through multiple international transshipment points before reaching Nigeria. The implication is that maritime enforcement cannot focus only on identifying finished narcotics. It increasingly has to understand the wider supply chain that makes inland production possible. That places greater importance on intelligence sharing among customs, port authorities, navies, coast guards, police forces, drug-enforcement agencies and international partners, particularly where legitimate commercial cargo can provide cover for illicit movements.
Two Mexican criminal organizations are driving this expansion: the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). According to Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution, the Sinaloa Cartel pioneered the African cocaine corridor, focusing initially on routing cocaine through Africa into Europe. CJNG followed with a characteristically more brutal and intense approach, an organization described by the International Institute for Strategic Studies as “more aggressive, ruthless and less willing to negotiate with rival power centers when moving into new territory,” with a presence on every continent except Antarctica.
Historically, West Africa’s role in the global narcotics trade has centered on transshipment. The region became an important corridor for cocaine moving from South America to Europe and, increasingly, for synthetic drugs destined for international markets. However, recent events show the region in an active phase which has been tested before, one in which it is becoming a site of industrial-scale production itself.
The choice of remote forest locations for these labs is equally telling. Such areas provide concealment from authorities, reduce the likelihood of accidental discovery, and allow criminal groups to establish secure operating bases with minimal scrutiny. This mirrors trends observed elsewhere in the world, where organized crime groups have increasingly moved production facilities away from certain areas into isolated environments that offer operational security.
The involvement of Mexican nationals also raises important questions about knowledge transfer. The global methamphetamine trade relies heavily on technical expertise and specialized production methods. As foreign criminal actors establish themselves in West Africa, there exists the possibility that these skills could gradually be transferred to local criminal networks, reducing dependence on external expertise and potentially enabling indigenous production capabilities to emerge over time. This might not be accidental, but could be a franchise model, where international expertise is embedded locally to build sustainable capacity.
A consequential question may be whether specialized knowledge becomes locally reproducible. The arrest of a foreign methamphetamine expert is an important enforcement success, but the long-term strategic concern is what happens if foreign expertise is gradually converted into local capability. Nigeria already has established chemical, pharmaceutical and logistics sectors, and UNODC has noted the country’s capacity to produce synthetic drugs alongside its role as an importer of precursor chemicals for legitimate pharmaceutical activity. That dual-use environment creates a difficult enforcement problem: the same commercial ecosystems that support legitimate industry can also provide knowledge, materials, equipment or logistical services that criminal actors may seek to exploit. The concern is not that legitimate industry is inherently complicit, but that criminal networks can draw on expertise and infrastructure that already exist. Over time, this could make production more resilient, because the network would no longer depend on a small number of foreign specialists. What begins as imported expertise could become embedded capability.
With distinctive drug production – particularly West African Kush and some forms of cannabis resin – already creating new directions in drug flows from Africa to other parts of the world, including to Latin America and the Caribbean, the expansion of drug production in Nigeria could spell trouble. In a country known for innovation and enterprise, establishing domestic illicit drug-making facilities could help fuel not only a growing demand for drugs in the African market, but a global demand for novel substances.
From a strategic perspective, these events may reflect broader changes within the global narcotics economy. Intensified counter-narcotics operations in the Americas, increasing maritime interdiction efforts, and heightened surveillance of established trafficking corridors have forced criminal organizations to adapt. Organized crime thrives on flexibility. When one route becomes difficult, another is created. When one production center becomes too risky, new locations emerge.
Africa may increasingly present itself as an attractive alternative offering lower operational risks, growing consumer markets, enforcement capacities gaps in certain jurisdictions, and access to new smuggling networks. The continent’s extensive coastline, busy commercial ports, and historical role in illicit trafficking routes also provide opportunities for integrating locally produced narcotics into existing maritime logistics chains.
This is where the issue transcends narcotics enforcement and becomes a broader security concern. Drug trafficking networks are rarely isolated enterprises. They are interconnected with money laundering, corruption, arms trafficking, document fraud, prostitution and sex trafficking and other forms of organized crime. The same criminal ecosystems that move drugs can also facilitate other illicit activities that undermine governance and regional security.
These developments deserve close attention. The recent events on industrial-scale drug production in Nigeria highlight how transnational criminal networks continue to adapt and exploit gaps across both land and maritime domains. While the laboratories themselves may be hidden deep within forests, the networks that sustain them are inherently transnational, relying on logistics, financial flows, and trafficking routes that extend far beyond Nigeria’s borders.
There is, of course, an irony to all of this. As global supply chains begin to crack and break under the strains caused by various strategic shocks (most notably conflicts at critical maritime choke points currently impeding the flow of about 20% of global energy), we see a general trend towards shrinking supply chains. By localizing food supply chains and others that are critical for human needs, we can potentially avoid the long shipment requirements, costs, and uncertainties around accessing goods in the globalized marketplace.
Drug cartels seem to be doing something similar while, at the same time, diversifying their footprint so as to ensure greater business resiliency and continuity amid these turbulent times. As many of the counter-narcotics entities, agencies, and mechanisms are focused on historic styles of drug flow, the cartels will likely have an advantage for some time, waiting for bureaucratic mechanisms to catch up and change mandates to focus on the necessary elements, including precursor chemicals and African-origin drugs. The question is how much damage can be done during that time delay?
The latest NDLEA operations are therefore more than drug seizures; they are indicators of an active threat environment. They suggest that West Africa’s role in the global narcotics trade is changing from a corridor of transit to a node of production.
Ebunoluwa George Ojo-Ami is a senior analyst specializing in maritime security, intelligence analysis, and unmanned systems across Africa’s maritime domain. His expertise spans Gulf of Guinea security dynamics, OSINT-driven intelligence analysis, maritime domain awareness, port and offshore security, drone threats, and the evolving use of unmanned systems in maritime security and operations by both state and non-state actors across Africa. His analysis has been featured in international security and maritime publications, and he has previously appeared on CIMSEC’s Sea Control podcast to discuss security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea.
Dr. Ian Ralby is President of Auxilium Worldwide, a charitable nonprofit that, among other things, focuses on ocean governance, and he is CEO of I.R. Consilium, a maritime and resource security consultancy. He is a globally recognized expert in maritime law and security and has worked in over 100 countries around the world, including having done extensive work on counter narcotics in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.
By Ebunoluwa George Ojo-Ami and Dr. Ian Ralby, CIMSEC
Video - Court visits jungle lab at center of Nigeria's biggest meth bust
In June 2026, Nigeria’s National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) uncovered an industrial-scale methamphetamine laboratory hidden within a forested area of Oyo State, arresting a Mexican national alongside four Nigerian accomplices. The operation came only weeks after authorities dismantled a Nigerian-Mexican methamphetamine syndicate operating another clandestine laboratory in Ogun State, resulting in the arrest of three Mexican nationals and six Nigerians.
The presence of foreign meth “cooks” operating in Nigeria is particularly significant. It shows that criminal networks are not merely using West Africa as a transit corridor for narcotics, but increasingly as a production hub. This shift suggests a deliberate strategy: relocating portions of the drug manufacturing chain closer to the markets, exploiting areas perceived as lower-risk operating environments, and diversifying logistics networks to improve concealment from law enforcement. If drug production can occur in Africa to supply both the African and European markets, it reduces the maritime visibility of the supply chains. Precursor chemicals can come from other parts of the world, complicating patterns of maritime drug enforcement in the region that have been working to improve their effectiveness in recent years and testing the legislation of coastal states.
The maritime dimension of this shift deserves closer scrutiny. The move from trafficking finished products across oceans to producing drugs closer to destination markets does not make the maritime angle disappear; it changes what security agencies and authorities need to detect. A laboratory hidden inland may have no obvious narcotics signature at the port, yet the production chain will still depend on the movement of raw material or precursor chemicals, equipment, solvents, financing and other inputs across borders. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has documented how precursor chemicals can enter West Africa through commercial channels and then be relocated to the site that is most logistically convenient, complicating efforts to differentiate between legitimate commerce and illicit diversion. Nigeria’s current enforcement experience also shows how central the maritime domain remains: in June and July 2026, NDLEA reported major seizures at Lagos ports involving containers that had moved through multiple international transshipment points before reaching Nigeria. The implication is that maritime enforcement cannot focus only on identifying finished narcotics. It increasingly has to understand the wider supply chain that makes inland production possible. That places greater importance on intelligence sharing among customs, port authorities, navies, coast guards, police forces, drug-enforcement agencies and international partners, particularly where legitimate commercial cargo can provide cover for illicit movements.
Two Mexican criminal organizations are driving this expansion: the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). According to Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution, the Sinaloa Cartel pioneered the African cocaine corridor, focusing initially on routing cocaine through Africa into Europe. CJNG followed with a characteristically more brutal and intense approach, an organization described by the International Institute for Strategic Studies as “more aggressive, ruthless and less willing to negotiate with rival power centers when moving into new territory,” with a presence on every continent except Antarctica.
Historically, West Africa’s role in the global narcotics trade has centered on transshipment. The region became an important corridor for cocaine moving from South America to Europe and, increasingly, for synthetic drugs destined for international markets. However, recent events show the region in an active phase which has been tested before, one in which it is becoming a site of industrial-scale production itself.
The choice of remote forest locations for these labs is equally telling. Such areas provide concealment from authorities, reduce the likelihood of accidental discovery, and allow criminal groups to establish secure operating bases with minimal scrutiny. This mirrors trends observed elsewhere in the world, where organized crime groups have increasingly moved production facilities away from certain areas into isolated environments that offer operational security.
The involvement of Mexican nationals also raises important questions about knowledge transfer. The global methamphetamine trade relies heavily on technical expertise and specialized production methods. As foreign criminal actors establish themselves in West Africa, there exists the possibility that these skills could gradually be transferred to local criminal networks, reducing dependence on external expertise and potentially enabling indigenous production capabilities to emerge over time. This might not be accidental, but could be a franchise model, where international expertise is embedded locally to build sustainable capacity.
A consequential question may be whether specialized knowledge becomes locally reproducible. The arrest of a foreign methamphetamine expert is an important enforcement success, but the long-term strategic concern is what happens if foreign expertise is gradually converted into local capability. Nigeria already has established chemical, pharmaceutical and logistics sectors, and UNODC has noted the country’s capacity to produce synthetic drugs alongside its role as an importer of precursor chemicals for legitimate pharmaceutical activity. That dual-use environment creates a difficult enforcement problem: the same commercial ecosystems that support legitimate industry can also provide knowledge, materials, equipment or logistical services that criminal actors may seek to exploit. The concern is not that legitimate industry is inherently complicit, but that criminal networks can draw on expertise and infrastructure that already exist. Over time, this could make production more resilient, because the network would no longer depend on a small number of foreign specialists. What begins as imported expertise could become embedded capability.
With distinctive drug production – particularly West African Kush and some forms of cannabis resin – already creating new directions in drug flows from Africa to other parts of the world, including to Latin America and the Caribbean, the expansion of drug production in Nigeria could spell trouble. In a country known for innovation and enterprise, establishing domestic illicit drug-making facilities could help fuel not only a growing demand for drugs in the African market, but a global demand for novel substances.
From a strategic perspective, these events may reflect broader changes within the global narcotics economy. Intensified counter-narcotics operations in the Americas, increasing maritime interdiction efforts, and heightened surveillance of established trafficking corridors have forced criminal organizations to adapt. Organized crime thrives on flexibility. When one route becomes difficult, another is created. When one production center becomes too risky, new locations emerge.
Africa may increasingly present itself as an attractive alternative offering lower operational risks, growing consumer markets, enforcement capacities gaps in certain jurisdictions, and access to new smuggling networks. The continent’s extensive coastline, busy commercial ports, and historical role in illicit trafficking routes also provide opportunities for integrating locally produced narcotics into existing maritime logistics chains.
This is where the issue transcends narcotics enforcement and becomes a broader security concern. Drug trafficking networks are rarely isolated enterprises. They are interconnected with money laundering, corruption, arms trafficking, document fraud, prostitution and sex trafficking and other forms of organized crime. The same criminal ecosystems that move drugs can also facilitate other illicit activities that undermine governance and regional security.
These developments deserve close attention. The recent events on industrial-scale drug production in Nigeria highlight how transnational criminal networks continue to adapt and exploit gaps across both land and maritime domains. While the laboratories themselves may be hidden deep within forests, the networks that sustain them are inherently transnational, relying on logistics, financial flows, and trafficking routes that extend far beyond Nigeria’s borders.
There is, of course, an irony to all of this. As global supply chains begin to crack and break under the strains caused by various strategic shocks (most notably conflicts at critical maritime choke points currently impeding the flow of about 20% of global energy), we see a general trend towards shrinking supply chains. By localizing food supply chains and others that are critical for human needs, we can potentially avoid the long shipment requirements, costs, and uncertainties around accessing goods in the globalized marketplace.
Drug cartels seem to be doing something similar while, at the same time, diversifying their footprint so as to ensure greater business resiliency and continuity amid these turbulent times. As many of the counter-narcotics entities, agencies, and mechanisms are focused on historic styles of drug flow, the cartels will likely have an advantage for some time, waiting for bureaucratic mechanisms to catch up and change mandates to focus on the necessary elements, including precursor chemicals and African-origin drugs. The question is how much damage can be done during that time delay?
The latest NDLEA operations are therefore more than drug seizures; they are indicators of an active threat environment. They suggest that West Africa’s role in the global narcotics trade is changing from a corridor of transit to a node of production.
Ebunoluwa George Ojo-Ami is a senior analyst specializing in maritime security, intelligence analysis, and unmanned systems across Africa’s maritime domain. His expertise spans Gulf of Guinea security dynamics, OSINT-driven intelligence analysis, maritime domain awareness, port and offshore security, drone threats, and the evolving use of unmanned systems in maritime security and operations by both state and non-state actors across Africa. His analysis has been featured in international security and maritime publications, and he has previously appeared on CIMSEC’s Sea Control podcast to discuss security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea.
Dr. Ian Ralby is President of Auxilium Worldwide, a charitable nonprofit that, among other things, focuses on ocean governance, and he is CEO of I.R. Consilium, a maritime and resource security consultancy. He is a globally recognized expert in maritime law and security and has worked in over 100 countries around the world, including having done extensive work on counter narcotics in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.
Related stories: How large scale meth production in Nigeria poses new security risks
Nigeria arrests alleged Mexican drug kingpin at international airport
That arrest resulted in the discovery of a suspected industrial-scale methamphetamine laboratory - the third such find allegedly linked to Mexicans in four months.
When Arturo Carrera Loaiza, 40, was detained at Lagos international airport, officials allegedly found digital images of him wearing what they believed to be a laboratory coat alongside equipment consistent with meth production.
The pictures' location data led officers to a property in Ebonyi state, where they said chemicals and drug-making equipment were found.
Loaiza has denied involvement in methamphetamine production and said he had been invited to Nigeria by a local contact for a restaurant business venture, according to a statement from the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).
The agency's investigators found a CCTV memory card at the suspected laboratory in Ebonyi with footage from the property showing someone who looked like Loaiza wearing a blue laboratory coat. A Nigerian man was also identified directing people as they removed chemicals and equipment from the site.
NDLEA chairman Gen Mohamed Buba Marwa said further intelligence led officers to an isolated house in a neighbouring community, where they recovered chemicals, dehydrators, condensers, a reaction pot, weighing scales, mixers, drums, gas burners and a sieve containing traces of methamphetamine.
No estimate has yet been given for how much methamphetamine the alleged laboratory was capable of producing.
Investigators have alleged that Loaiza had recruited and brought a fellow Mexican to work at another suspected methamphetamine laboratory hidden in a forest in Oyo state, which was raided in June. Four Nigerians were also arrested after the raid.
A month earlier, NDLEA officers arrested three Mexican nationals and seven Nigerians at what the agency described as an industrial-scale methamphetamine laboratory hidden in a forest in another part of the country.
Marwa said the operations showed international criminal groups were attempting to establish drug-production facilities in Nigeria's forests and rural communities.
"Nigeria will not be allowed to become a haven for transnational drug cartels seeking to relocate their laboratories from other jurisdictions into our forests and rural communities", he said.
The NDLEA said its investigation into the network is ongoing, including into those it believes financed or helped facilitate the operations in Nigeria.
Unlike plant-based drugs, such as cocaine or heroin, which can only be grown and processed in certain places, a synthetic drug like meth can be produced anywhere with the right chemicals and expertise, making it easier for organised crime groups to quickly scale up production.
West Africa poses numerous attractive benefits to Mexican syndicates, starting with swathes of forested land which serves well for secluded production sites.
By Simi Jolaoso, BBC
Related stories: Video - Nigeria dismantles its largest meth lab as Mexican cartel push into country
Tuesday, September 15, 2026
Africa's richest man Dangote's IPO out of reach in Nigeria
This initial public offering of Dangote Industries is intended to help support a $14.3 billion expansion, which would more than double the refinery's production capacity. In absolute numbers, it would increase capacity from 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 1.4 million bpd.
It would also include new petrochemical and refining units designed to reduce Nigeria's reliance on imports of some petrochemical products while also allowing the plant to produce different grades of diesel.
This plan would make the refinery one of the largest single-site refining complexes in the world.
Dangote's ambitious plans also include the launch of a processing plant in Kenya to extend his reach from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, which is planned to be launched in partnership with governments in eastern Africa.
African success story
Since it began operations in 2024, the Dangote Petroleum Refinery has started to reshape Nigeria's fuel market and has become one of the few businesses in the world to benefit from the ongoing supply disruptions caused by the war in Iran.
The refinery has become an important supplier of petrol and other fuels domestically and abroad; in fact, it made Nigeria a net exporter of refined fuel for the first time after reaching its full capacity in early 2026.
The refinery reported making an after-tax profit of $1.82 billion in the first half of 2026, following a $476 million loss for all of 2025.
Things appear to be on the up-and-up for Dangote — so, why is the company seeking public investment now?
Why is Dangote going public?
Ayodele Oni, an energy analyst and partner with the Bloomfield Law Practice in Lagos, told DW that the public offering could be a "game changer," as it alters the role of who could stand to benefit from Dangote's expansion drive.
Oni said equity invested by potentially millions of Nigerian and international shareholders would shield the corporation from having to rely solely on expensive dollar debt "with permanent Naira capital, which matches a business now earning heavily in Naira."
This could also unlock additional long-term investment as any "listed company answers to ... its shareholders every quarter."
"That transparency is precisely what long-term lenders and international partners want to see before the next billion is committed," Oni said.
He said this would turn into a sustainable model for Dangote, as the approach would be designed to permanently "lower its cost of capital for every future phase."
Since it began operations in 2024, the Dangote Petroleum Refinery has started to reshape Nigeria's fuel market and has become one of the few businesses in the world to benefit from the ongoing supply disruptions caused by the war in Iran.
The refinery has become an important supplier of petrol and other fuels domestically and abroad; in fact, it made Nigeria a net exporter of refined fuel for the first time after reaching its full capacity in early 2026.
The refinery reported making an after-tax profit of $1.82 billion in the first half of 2026, following a $476 million loss for all of 2025.
Things appear to be on the up-and-up for Dangote — so, why is the company seeking public investment now?
Why is Dangote going public?
Ayodele Oni, an energy analyst and partner with the Bloomfield Law Practice in Lagos, told DW that the public offering could be a "game changer," as it alters the role of who could stand to benefit from Dangote's expansion drive.
Oni said equity invested by potentially millions of Nigerian and international shareholders would shield the corporation from having to rely solely on expensive dollar debt "with permanent Naira capital, which matches a business now earning heavily in Naira."
This could also unlock additional long-term investment as any "listed company answers to ... its shareholders every quarter."
"That transparency is precisely what long-term lenders and international partners want to see before the next billion is committed," Oni said.
He said this would turn into a sustainable model for Dangote, as the approach would be designed to permanently "lower its cost of capital for every future phase."
For 'the people' of Nigeria
Oni summarized the potential of the deal by referring to it as a restructuring of both who bears the risk — and who stands to share with the reward, with "the people" being the greatest beneficiaries of the IPO, at least to his mind.
Opening up the ownership of the refinery business to ordinary Nigerians does not automatically mean that many can afford it, however.
The pricing of the initial offering is indeed priced at an affordable 525 Naira (€0.34/$0.39) a piece for each of the 4.1 billion ordinary shares, and a minimum of just 10 shares.
At the signing ceremony in Lagos, Dangote said the company was trying to "make sure that the majority of … our drivers, our cook, our servants, our managers, everybody will have an opportunity to have a stake in the refinery."
Nigeria: Deep inequality, deeper pockets
In a country where almost two-thirds of the population is struggling with extreme poverty, according to Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, that figure can translate into 10% of the minimum wage — for people who are fortunate enough to have a job.
Entry-level employees and workers who perform menial tasks at Dangote are fortunate enough to earn almost four times the minimum wage in Nigeria, according to media reports — though this still translates to only about $150 a month in a country that has been witnessing steep inflation, especially in petrol prices. For most, seeing any personal benefit by investing in Nigeria's oil remains a pipe dream.
Charles Asiegbu, a policy and economic analyst who has worked as a consultant for various Nigerian organizations, told DW that Dangote's description of the offer as "for the people" could still qualify as a "psychological masterstroke" for those who can afford to invest.
Asiegbu said broader ownership could bring a large number of Nigerians into one consolidated platform, changing how they view the refinery.
"With millions as shareholders, it would shift from a private enterprise to a national asset in the public consciousness," Asiegbu said.
Oni summarized the potential of the deal by referring to it as a restructuring of both who bears the risk — and who stands to share with the reward, with "the people" being the greatest beneficiaries of the IPO, at least to his mind.
Opening up the ownership of the refinery business to ordinary Nigerians does not automatically mean that many can afford it, however.
The pricing of the initial offering is indeed priced at an affordable 525 Naira (€0.34/$0.39) a piece for each of the 4.1 billion ordinary shares, and a minimum of just 10 shares.
At the signing ceremony in Lagos, Dangote said the company was trying to "make sure that the majority of … our drivers, our cook, our servants, our managers, everybody will have an opportunity to have a stake in the refinery."
Nigeria: Deep inequality, deeper pockets
In a country where almost two-thirds of the population is struggling with extreme poverty, according to Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, that figure can translate into 10% of the minimum wage — for people who are fortunate enough to have a job.
Entry-level employees and workers who perform menial tasks at Dangote are fortunate enough to earn almost four times the minimum wage in Nigeria, according to media reports — though this still translates to only about $150 a month in a country that has been witnessing steep inflation, especially in petrol prices. For most, seeing any personal benefit by investing in Nigeria's oil remains a pipe dream.
Charles Asiegbu, a policy and economic analyst who has worked as a consultant for various Nigerian organizations, told DW that Dangote's description of the offer as "for the people" could still qualify as a "psychological masterstroke" for those who can afford to invest.
Asiegbu said broader ownership could bring a large number of Nigerians into one consolidated platform, changing how they view the refinery.
"With millions as shareholders, it would shift from a private enterprise to a national asset in the public consciousness," Asiegbu said.
IPO excites investors
Nigerians who can afford to invest in Dangote appear to quickly be adopting that mindset.
Olamilekan Oladehinde, a Nigerian retail investor, told DW that he is "excited" to partake in the launch and buy shares. He said Dangote was now much more than just a private enterprise: It has become a key national asset that addresses direct social problems in Nigeria — including fuel shortages.
"They're trying to expand, and that's something I am very proud and happy to identify with," Oladehinde said. "The fact that it's also owned by a Nigerian makes me more than happy, and that's why I will be buying a stake in the company," he said about the richest man in Africa.
Nigerians who can afford to invest in Dangote appear to quickly be adopting that mindset.
Olamilekan Oladehinde, a Nigerian retail investor, told DW that he is "excited" to partake in the launch and buy shares. He said Dangote was now much more than just a private enterprise: It has become a key national asset that addresses direct social problems in Nigeria — including fuel shortages.
"They're trying to expand, and that's something I am very proud and happy to identify with," Oladehinde said. "The fact that it's also owned by a Nigerian makes me more than happy, and that's why I will be buying a stake in the company," he said about the richest man in Africa.
Risks and opportunities
Oladehinde said he had no concerns about investing in Dangote — despite the fact that various market experts have cautioned investors to be mindful of potential risks, especially because refining is a cyclical business.
Oni said Dangote was riding a wave during the current situation across the Middle East; however, fortunes could change — especially when the tensions around the Strait of Hormuz eventually ease. A return to steep competition in oil prices from those Middle Eastern countries could then saturate markets.
Dangote's strengths were a mitigating factor, Oni said: "The Middle East disruption showed that a refinery on [Nigeria's] Atlantic coast can supply Europe and the Americas faster than the Gulf can — and, at 700,000 bpd, the plant has already proven the model, so the expansion is about scale on an existing site, which is the cheapest capacity anyone can build."
Oladehinde said this was exactly the outlook that he will be betting on. "I believe the time has come for us," he said. "We can't lose this the momentum."
Oladehinde said he had no concerns about investing in Dangote — despite the fact that various market experts have cautioned investors to be mindful of potential risks, especially because refining is a cyclical business.
Oni said Dangote was riding a wave during the current situation across the Middle East; however, fortunes could change — especially when the tensions around the Strait of Hormuz eventually ease. A return to steep competition in oil prices from those Middle Eastern countries could then saturate markets.
Dangote's strengths were a mitigating factor, Oni said: "The Middle East disruption showed that a refinery on [Nigeria's] Atlantic coast can supply Europe and the Americas faster than the Gulf can — and, at 700,000 bpd, the plant has already proven the model, so the expansion is about scale on an existing site, which is the cheapest capacity anyone can build."
Oladehinde said this was exactly the outlook that he will be betting on. "I believe the time has come for us," he said. "We can't lose this the momentum."
Monday, September 14, 2026
Video - Young Nigerian filmmakers carve out Nollywood’s sci-fi niche
Nollywood’s sci-fi genre remains constrained by high production costs and limited investment, but a new generation of filmmakers is attracting growing audience interest. AI and digital tools are opening up new creative possibilities, while filmmakers say greater funding, talent development and industry support are needed to build a sustainable sci-fi sector.
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