US., Nigerian forces kill top Islamic State leader

U.S. and Nigerian forces killed Islamic State’s alleged No. 2, a man linked to terrorist attacks against religious minorities and the mass kidnapping of schoolchildren, officials said.

Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Mainuki guided Islamic State “on matters relating to media operations, economic warfare and the development and manufacturing of weapons, explosives and drones,” Maj. Gen. Samaila Uba, spokesman for Nigeria’s armed forces, said in a release Saturday.

Al-Mainuki, born in Nigeria in 1982, had also led Islamic State fundraising operations, according to a United Nations report issued last year.

The operation that killed him, which took place in the Lake Chad Basin in northeastern Nigeria, was “a major breakthrough in ongoing efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism” regionally and globally, Uba said.

The U.S. and its allies have for years been killing top leaders of Islamic State and al Qaeda. Officials recognize that new militants step up to take their places, but argue that repeated decapitation blows weaken insurgents’ ability to plan, finance and carry out attacks.

Officials were vague about the role played by each country’s troops in this week’s Nigeria operation, which, according to a U.S. official, included both a ground assault and airstrikes. The U.S. has far greater air-attack capabilities than does Nigeria, and the Pentagon released a video of what appeared to be a devastating strike on an Islamic State position.

President Trump said in a social-media post that “brave American forces and the Armed Forces of Nigeria flawlessly executed a meticulously planned and very complex mission.” Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu said the operation also killed several al-Mainuki lieutenants.

Since establishing a short-lived caliphate in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s, Islamic State has increasingly focused operations in Africa, from the arid expanses of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the west to Somalia in the east. Defense officials believe a Somali, Abdul Qadir Mumin, is now the group’s global leader.

The U.N. reported last year that there were some 8,000 to 12,000 fighters in Islamic State ranks in West Africa, an area also contested by powerful local al Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin.

From its African bases, Islamic State aspires to conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. and European interests at home and overseas, according to American officials.

Al-Mainuki “thought he could hide in Africa, but little did he know we had sources who kept us informed on what he was doing,” Trump wrote.

The coordinated operation reflects the significant warming of U.S.-Nigeria relations since last year, when Trump blamed the Nigerian government’s inaction for what he described as “genocide” of Christians committed by Muslim militants.

At the time, Trump threatened to cut aid to Nigeria and send American troops in “guns-a-blazing” to kill Islamist extremists.

In the rapprochement that followed, the U.S. dispatched hundreds of American troops to train Nigerian forces, including in the complicated tactics of coordinated air-and-infantry operations. The U.S. said at the time that the American troops would provide intelligence on militant targets, but wouldn’t be involved in ground combat.

“Africa is the most important area of operations for Islamic State,” said Hans-Jakob Schindler, the former coordinator of the U.N. Security Council’s panel on Islamic State and al Qaeda. But Nigeria is a particular focus because it involves violence against Christians that resonates with Trump’s political base, Schindler said.

Attuned to Trump’s concerns, the Nigerians made a point Saturday of highlighting al-Mainuki’s role in overseeing attacks against ethnic and religious minorities. Trump made a point of thanking the Nigerian government for its role in the operation.

Al-Mainuki’s extremist roots could be traced back to Boko Haram, a Nigerian militant group infamous for kidnapping children, and he was linked to a 2018 abduction of more than 100 schoolgirls in Nigeria’s Yobe State.

By Benoit Faucon and Michael M. Phillips, WSJ

Related story US military carries out more strikes against ISIL fighters in Nigeria

Dangote refinery sues to halt Nigeria petrol imports amid market battle

Dangote Petroleum Refinery, the $20bn refining complex owned by Nigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote, has intensified its battle with fuel importers and downstream marketers after filing a fresh lawsuit seeking to halt petrol imports into Nigeria, reopening a fierce debate over competition and supply security in Africa’s largest fuel market.

Court documents reviewed by Reuters showed the Lekki-based refinery asked the Federal High Court in Lagos to void import licences issued by the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA) to several marketers, arguing the approvals violated the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) and an earlier court order to maintain the status quo.

The suit targets import permits granted to NIPCO Plc (NGX:NIPCO), AA Rano, Matrix Energy, Shafa, Pinnacle Oil and Bono Energy, which were collectively authorised to import about 720,000 metric tonnes of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), as petrol is locally known, equivalent to roughly 960mn litres of petrol.

Under the allocations, NIPCO is expected to import 120,000 metric tonnes, AA Rano 150,000 metric tonnes, Matrix Energy 150,000 metric tonnes, Shafa 120,000 metric tonnes, Pinnacle Oil 120,000 metric tonnes and Bono Energy 60,000 metric tonnes.

An NMDPRA official quoted anonymously said the licences were approved to complement local supply and prevent shortages, maintaining the regulator’s long-standing position that imports remain necessary until domestic refining can consistently meet national demand.

The 650,000 barrels-per-day (bpd) Dangote refinery, however, argued that continued imports undermine its operations and contradict provisions of the PIA, which it says only permit imports in cases of demonstrated supply shortfall.

The case marks a renewed escalation in tensions between the refinery and downstream marketers after Dangote previously withdrew a similar lawsuit against the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL), the only entity licensed to operate in the country's petroleum industry.

President Bola Tinubu last week publicly defended the government’s support for the refinery during the Africa CEO Forum in Rwanda, confirming he approved the naira-for-crude arrangement designed to improve domestic crude supply and reduce pressure on Nigeria’s foreign exchange reserves.

Aliko Dangote recently disclosed that the refinery had processed crude at 661,000 bpd, exceeding its projected installed capacity, while outlining plans to expand capacity to 1.4mn bpd within the next 30 months. It currently sources about 56% of its crude feedstock from Nigeria, with the remainder imported from countries including Angola, Libya and the United States.

The Depot and Petroleum Products Marketers Association of Nigeria (DAPPMAN) strongly opposed the lawsuit, warning that attempts to invalidate import licences could destabilise the downstream market and threaten billions of naira invested in storage depots, logistics and fuel distribution infrastructure.

“The import licences at the centre of this lawsuit are not administrative courtesies. They are the legal instruments through which Nigeria’s fuel supply chain functions,” DAPPMAN said in a statement, cited by local outlet The Punch.

The association argued that the PIA gives the regulator discretion to issue import licences where necessary to ensure supply security and warned against allowing “a private refinery’s commercial interests” to override the regulator’s statutory mandate.

Industry participants have increasingly warned that a complete halt to imports could create market concentration risks, while supporters of the refinery argue that continued imports discourage domestic refining investment and undermine efforts to achieve energy self-sufficiency.

Nigeria has historically relied heavily on imported petrol despite being Africa’s largest crude producer, with weak state-owned refining capacity forcing the country to spend billions of dollars annually on fuel imports before Dangote refinery began large-scale operations.

Dangote Petroleum Refinery & Petrochemicals plans to launch an initial public offering in mid-2026 targeting a valuation of $40bn-$50bn, with between 5% and 10% of the refinery business expected to be offered to investors.

The listing is expected to span multiple African exchanges, including the Nigerian Exchange (NGX), and would rank among the largest capital market transactions in Africa if completed.

Intelli News

Related story: Nigeria fuel demand rises as Dangote drives near-full refining capacity

How ISWAP and Boko Haram are reshaping the Lake Chad Basin

The killing of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, the second-in-command of ISIL (ISIS), by United States and Nigerian forces marks a notable achievement for “counterterrorism”. Yet for analysts observing the Lake Chad Basin, it highlights how persistent and complex insecurity in the region has become.

Al-Minuki, a Nigerian national from Borno State, was operating out of a compound near Lake Chad, at the centre of one of the world’s most active armed group theatres.

His choice of northeastern Nigeria as a base underscores the conditions driving a renewed surge of violence by both the ISIL affiliate in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and its rival, Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS), more widely known as Boko Haram.

Perhaps equally significant is the parallel resurgence of Boko Haram, which quietly rebuilt itself while security agencies primarily focused on the more dominant ISWAP.

“While regional forces focused on countering ISWAP’s threats, partly due to the group’s advanced drone capabilities, Boko Haram appears to have taken advantage of the relative attention on its rival to regroup,” Nimi Princewill, a security expert in the Sahel, told Al Jazeera. “This, in turn, seems to have enabled both factions to rebuild strength and carry out further attacks in the area.”

Borders, weak governance, and violence spike

Beyond the immediate tactical manoeuvre of Boko Haram and ISWAP, the resurgence of violence in the Lake Chad Basin also underscores the broader regional challenges of coordination and intelligence-sharing among affected states.

“Although Mali and Nigeria do not share a common border, the large expanse of the Sahel that straddles them has several porous borders that allow the movement of jihadi elements and their weapons. The situation in Mali has made the Sahel a more permissive environment for armed groups, amplifying risks for Nigeria through spillover dynamics,” Kabir Amadu, managing director of Beacon Security and Intelligence Limited in Nigeria, told Al Jazeera.

Meanwhile, efforts by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to harmonise military operations are frequently hampered by logistical bottlenecks, differing command structures, and uneven resource allocation, allowing armed groups to exploit gaps along porous borders.

Local communities, on the other hand, face the dual pressures of insecurity and humanitarian deprivation, often relying on informal networks for protection and sustenance, which can inadvertently provide concealment or mobility corridors for armed rebels. Humanitarian agencies report that civilians are increasingly caught in cycles of displacement and forced recruitment, while regional security forums struggle to implement preventative measures that go beyond episodic military interventions.

In some areas, fear, mistrust, and weakened traditional authority structures may make communities more vulnerable to coercion or influence by armed groups. These social pressures can create conditions that Boko Haram and ISWAP may be able to exploit.

Economic factors also seem to play a notable role in the resurgence of both groups. Control of the Lake Chad islands could provide authority over taxation routes, smuggling corridors, and resource extraction, turning the islands into potentially lucrative areas of competition that extend beyond purely ideological motives.

Violence mechanics

This combination of armed activity and criminal enterprise also appears to support how the groups sustain themselves. Boko Haram’s mix of ideological and criminal operations, including robbery and kidnapping, may help fund its activities while attracting disaffected youth. Recruitment seems influenced by the region’s fragile socioeconomic conditions, including high poverty and unemployment, rather than ideology alone.

The shortcomings of reintegration programmes are also considered to contribute to the problem, with former combatants rejoining Boko Haram after facing limited life prospects. ISS research found that former ISWAP members, who would face execution for deserting their group, were joining Boko Haram’s Ghazwah wing in Borno, notorious for robbery and ransom operations.

In addition to financial and operational factors, the groups exploit gaps in local governance and security presence to consolidate influence. Remote communities often experience inconsistent law enforcement, limited state services, and weak administrative oversight, creating spaces where armed groups can operate with relative impunity.

“ISWAP and Boko Haram have become active again in the Lake Chad Basin for three main reasons: their resilience and ability to adapt to the evolving tactics of the Nigerian armed forces; the lucrative economy of violence that sustains their funding and manpower; and the Nigerian state’s limited ability to establish a legitimate, lasting presence in the region that could undermine their credibility,” Chris Ogunmodede, a Nigerian political analyst, told Al Jazeera.

Beyond military reach

Many of the factors driving armed attacks in the Lake Chad Basin are unlikely to be solved by military operations alone. The conditions that give ISWAP and Boko Haram their recruitment base, logistical support, and social legitimacy in some communities can be traced to decades of poverty, displacement, governance gaps, and political exclusion.

Data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) shows the region hosts 2.9 million internally displaced people, including 2.3 million in Nigeria. Violence has forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the Lake Chad Basin, while humanitarian actors received just 19 percent of the funding required for 2025.

“ISWAP and Boko Haram’s recent resurgence reflects not simply a military setback, but a deepening governance vacuum across the Lake Chad Basin,” Abiola Sadiq, a security consultant, told Al Jazeera.

The Lake Chad Basin continues to face overlapping crises: millions remain displaced, schools are closed, and humanitarian aid is insufficient. Armed groups exploit geographic and administrative gaps to expand operations, while regional security cooperation struggles to keep pace with their adaptability.

“While the reported killing of ISIL leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki may temporarily disrupt command structures, it is also likely to trigger retaliatory violence as rival jihadist factions compete for relevance, legitimacy, and territorial influence,” said Sadiq.

In the weeks following the strike, intelligence reports recorded a surge in small-scale attacks and cross-border raids, indicating that operational fragmentation has not diminished the groups’ capacity to coordinate assaults. Civilians continue to face restricted movement and elevated risks of recruitment, extortion, and displacement.

“With Nigeria’s 2027 general elections approaching, these groups are highly likely to intensify their operations, potentially extending attacks beyond their traditional strongholds in the Lake Chad Basin and northeastern Nigeria,” said Sadiq.

By Mubarak Aliyu, Al Jazeera

Former poachers in Nigeria find redemption as forest rangers

In Nigeria’s remaining rainforest reserves, wildlife is under pressure from logging, hunting, and economic hardship. But one former poacher is now part of the solution. This report follows rangers working to protect the forest, showing how conservation can also create new opportunities for local communities. DW West Africa correspondent Amaka Okoye reports from Okumu National Park in Nigeria.

DW

Latest militant attacks on schools in Nigeria leave more than 80 children missing, officials say

A wave of militant attacks on schools in Nigeria over the last week has resulted in more than 80 children gone missing, local officials and a rights group said Sunday, the latest in school abductions in the West African country where the government is battling an array of jihadi and other armed groups.

The attackers targeted a primary school in the war-torn state of Borno, in Nigeria’s northeastern corner, sometime between Wednesday and Thursday. The militants abducted 42 children there, in the Askira Uba and Chibok areas.

Amnesty International said that attack took place in the village of Mussa near Sambisa Forest, a stronghold of militants from Boko Haram and its splinter group, an Islamic State affiliate known as the Islamic State West Africa Province.

Across the country, two secondary schools in the southwestern Oyo state were attacked hours apart Friday, and at least 40 children were abducted there, according to Amnesty’s Nigeria branch. Such abductions are rare in that area.

The rights group warned Sunday that the threat of abduction is forcing many children out of school, while underage girls are being pulled out of classrooms and forced into marriage by families seeking to protect them from school attacks.

Peter Wabba, a government official from Mussa, said Sunday that he was told that 48 children had been abducted in Oyo.

“The government is assuring us that they are doing their ... best to see that these children are rescued, but up till now, we are still waiting,” he told the Associated Press.

Amnesty also said that the authorities “never fulfill promises to investigate the incidents and bring the perpetrators to justice.”

“Victims and their families continue to be denied access to justice,” it said.

On Saturday, police spokesperson Ayanlade Olayinka told the AP that three gunmen were detained in connection with the Oyo attack, which took place in the Oriire area, about 135 miles from Lagos, Nigeria’s largest city.

The suspects were identified by the community and arrested, Olayinka said. Police did not say whether they were searching for more suspects.

Abductions of schoolchildren are common in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, especially in the country’s north. Last year, two mass abductions from schools rocked the nation, with more than 300 children taken in the northern region.

School kidnappings have come to define the lack of security in Nigeria, and analysts say it’s often because armed gangs see schools as strategic targets they can exploit to draw attention.

By Dyepkazah Shibayan, AP

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